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I. THE MEDICAL MALPRACTICE ACT IN VIRGINIA
A. Background
Chapter 611, 1976 Acts of Assembly,' provided for sweeping
changes in the laws of medical and hospital negligence in Virginia.
The Act affects all medical negligence actions arising after July 1,
1976. The legislation was enacted during a time when many per-
ceived a medical malpractice crisis in Virginia. This article will re-
view the historical background which led to this perception and
will analyze whether, in fact, this crisis did exist. Finally, the arti-
cle will demonstrate that the Act is both unnecessary and more
importantly, unconstitutional.
B. General Overview of the Act
The title to Chapter 611 recites that the Act relates to "limita-
tions on recovery for pain and suffering in certain actions . . .
A preamble to the Act states the legislative finding that the in-
creased cost and difficulty of obtaining medical malpractice insur-
1. Act of Apr. 9, 1976, ch. 611, 1976 Va. Acts 784 (codified at VA. CODE ANN. §§ 8.01-581.1
to -.18 (Repl. Vol. 1977) and §§ 8.01-581.1 to -.20 (Cune. Supp. 1982)). Section 8.01-581.12:2
provides that the Act shall not apply to any cause of action which arose prior to July 1,
1976.
2. 1976 Va. Acts, ch. 611.
800 [Vol. 16:799
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ance had discouraged and would continue to discourage health care
professionals from practicing in Virginia.
Whereas, the General Assembly has determined that it is becom-
ing increasingly difficult for health care providers of the Common-
wealth to obtain medical malpractice insurance with limits at afford-
able rates in excess of $750,000; and
Whereas, the difficulty, cost and potential unavailability of such
insurance has caused health care providers to cease providing ser-
vices or to retire prematurely and has become a substantial impair-
ment to health care providers entering into practice in the Common-
wealth and reduces or will tend to reduce the number of young
people interested in or willing to enter health care careers; and
Whereas, these factors constitute a significant problem adversely
affecting the public health, safety and welfare which necessitates the
imposition of a limitation on the liability of health care providers in
tort actions commonly referred to as medical malpractice cases.3
The Act first added a section to the Virginia Code which placed
a $750,000 limitation on recovery against any health care provider
in a malpractice action where the act or acts of malpractice oc-
curred on or after April 1, 1977. Another section grants immunity
from civil liability to every member or consultant of any committee
or group for "any act, decision, omission, or utterance done or
made in performance of his duties while serving as a member of
such [a body, whose primary function is] to review, evaluate or
make recommendations '5 on various matters which could give rise
to a claim for medical malpractice, provided that the action is not
taken in bad faith or with malice.6 The Act also included a section
establishing as privileged communication, free from legal discov-
ery, the proceedings and reports of any medical staff committee,
utilization review board, or other committee as well as all oral and
written communication generated to or by these bodies.7
An article now entitled Medical Malpractice Review Panels: Ar-
bitration of Malpractice Claims originally was added to the Code
by this Act.8 The article includes a section which broadly defines
3. Id.
4. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-581.15 (Repl. Vol. 1977).
5. Id. § 8.01-581.16 (Cum. Supp. 1982).
6. Id.
7. Id. § 8.01-581.17 (RepL Vol. 1977).
8. Id. § 8.01-581.1 to -.12:2 (Repl. Vol. 1977).
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"health care provider."' Malpractice is defined to mean "any tort
based on health care or professional services rendered, or which
should have been rendered by a health care provider, to a
patient."'10
Under the Act, no action may be brought for malpractice against
a health care provider unless the claimant notifies the health care
provider in writing before filing suit."' Within sixty days of notifi-
cation, either party may file with the Chief Justice of the Virginia
Supreme Court, a written request for a review by a Medical Mal-
practice Review Panel. 12 The Panel consists of three neutral attor-
neys and three neutral health care providers, licensed and actively
practicing their professions in Virginia, and is chaired by a sitting
judge of a circuit court.'3
The Panel may make one or more of the following four findings:
(1) the appropriate standard of care was observed; (2) a failure to
meet the appropriate standard of care was the proximate cause of
the alleged damages; (3) although the professional deviated from
the standard, the deviation was not the proximate cause of the al-
leged injury; or (4) there is a material factual issue of liability,
which does not require an expert opinion and which is appropriate
for consideration by a court or jury. 14 The Panel's opinion is ad-
missible as evidence in any legal action subsequently brought by
the claimant. 5 Members of the Panel are given absolute immunity
from civil liability from their conclusions. All members, except the
chairman, may be called to testify in such actions.'6
While the 1976 Act directed that all medical malpractice settle-
9. Health care provider, as defined in VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-581.1(1) (Repl. Vol. 1977),
means a person, corporation, facility or institution licensed by the state to provide health
care or professional services, including physicians, hospitals, dentists, pharmacists, regis-
tered or licensed practical nurses, optometrists, podiatrists, chiropractors, physical ther-
apists, physical therapy assistants, clinical psychologists, nursing homes and officers, em-
ployees or agents of nursing homes.
10. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-581.1.5 (Cur. Supp. 1982).
11. Id. § 8.01-581.2.A (Repl. Vol. 1977).
12. Id.
13. Id. § 8.01-581.3 (Repl. Vol. 1977).
14. Id. § 8.01-581.7.A. The section further states that if the panel does find that a failure
to meet the appropriate standard of care was the proximate cause of the injury, it may
determine the nature of the impairment or disability and its degree and extent. The opinion
shall be in writing, signed by the agreeing panelists, and mailed to the claimant and health
care provider within five days of its issuance.
15. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01581.8 (Cur. Supp. 1982).
16. Id.
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ments or judgments be reported to the Commissioner of Insurance
for consideration of the reasonableness of malpractice insurance
premium rates,"7 this section was repealed effective January 1,
1982.18 The provisions of the Act are severable, and if any part is
held unconstitutional by a court of competent jurisdiction, the de-
cision of such court shall not affect or impair any of the remaining
provisions.19
C. Limitation on Recovery
The Virginia Code provides that "in any verdict returned against
a health care provider in an action for malpractice ... the total
amount recoverable for any injury to or, death of, a patient shall
not exceed seven hundred fifty thousand dollars. '20 Several ques-
tions arise regarding the interpretation of this section. First, since
the limit is said to apply to a health care provider, in an action
against several health care providers alleging separate acts or omis-
sions constituting negligence against each, is the $750,000 cap ap-
plicable to each health care provider, or is the cap a total ceiling of
recovery against all defendants who may each have separate insur-
ance policies? Second, in actions on behalf of infants, is the limita-
tion on recovery applicable to both the infants' and parents' cases?
The total amount recoverable is said to apply to an injury to, or
death of a "patient," defined as "any natural person who receives
or shall have received health care from a licensed health care pro-
vider .... ,,21 Does the word "patient" include the parents of an in-
fant patient? Third, is the limitation, characterized as a limitation
on "recovery for pain and suffering, '22 a cap on damages for pain
and suffering only? The Constitution of Virginia states that "no
law shall embrace more than one object, which shall be expressed
in its title. 21 3 Fourth, is the cap applicable to wrongful death cases
where pain and suffering of a decedent are not elements of dam-
ages recoverable by a survivor? Fifth, does the recovery limit apply
to cases arising under the Federal Tort Claims Act,24 including
claims against physicians at naval or veterans' hospitals? Finally,
17. Id. § 38.1-389.3 (RepL VoL 1981).
18. Id. § 38.1-389.3 (Cum. Supp. 1982).
19. 1976 Va. Acts, ch. 611. This language is not codified.
20. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-581.15 (RepL Vol. 1977).
21. Id. § 8.01-581.1.3 (Cum. Supp. 1982).
22. 1976 Va. Acts, ch. 611.
23. VA. CONST. art. IV, § 12.
24. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2671-2680 (1980).
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does the ceiling apply to actions arising under Section 1983 of the
Civil Rights Act?25 These and many more questions still remain to
be answered and indicate that further scrutiny of the Virginia
Medical Malpractice Act is necessary.
II. HISTORY OF THE ACT
The Virginia Medical Malpractice Act was a result of the so-
called medical malpractice crisis of the early 1970's. The "crisis"
followed on the coattails of the national movement to enact federal
no-fault automobile insurance legislation. However, the federal No-
Fault Bill for automobile reparations died in the House Commerce
and Finance Sub-Committee.2 e
It was widely claimed during the early 1970's that the field of
malpractice law was experiencing a crisis of the following nature:
At some point in the early 1970s, it was said that juries began to
award verdicts so large that they could not have been anticipated by
insurance companies, and as a consequence, medical insurers suf-
fered huge losses on malpractice policies. These insurers responded
by raising premiums sharply, which in turn led many doctors to re-
fuse insurance and attempt to shield themselves from malpractice
liability by other methods .... [B]oth insurers and the medical com-
munity pressed legislatures in many states [including Virginia] ... to
take measures to limit the size of malpractice awards. Plaintiffs'
lawyers opposed this legislation, arguing that jury verdicts were not
excessive and that insurance company losses resulted from invest-
ment losses rather than from inordinately large awards.27
25. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1980).
26. 17A A. TRIAL LAW. Am. NEwsLETTER 425 (1974). "[T]he attack will not only be against
the tort system in the automobile reparations field, but will likely extend to all fields of tort
law."
27. M. PETERSON & S. PRST, THE CrvIL JURY 34 (Rand Corp. Doc. No. R-2881-ICJ,
1982). Interested readers may wish to consult a forthcoming Rand Document, P. DANZON &
L. LILLARD, THE RESOLUTION OF MEDICAL MALPRACTICE CLAIMS (Rand Corp. Doc. No. R-
2792-ICJ, 1982), which reportedly examines some 6,000 medical malpractice claims filed
during the mid-1970's. According to advance information, the article concludes that the net
effect of caps on verdicts and other techniques for reducing the amount of damages "was to
reduce trial awards by 30 percent, cut the average out-of-court settlement by 25 percent,
raise the portion of cases dropped from 43 percent to 48 percent and reduce the share of
cases going to actual verdict from 5.1 to 4.6 percent." INSTTUTE FOR CIvIL JUSTICE, A RE-
PORT ON THE SECON PROGRAM YEAR 15 (1982) [hereinafter cited as ICJ]. Half the dollars
paid to plaintiffs were said to be concentrated in only 3% of the claims, and most were cases
of severe injury and heavy economic loss. The study estimates that half of the dropped
claims (one fourth of the claims analyzed) would have resulted in a plaintiff's award if they
had been taken to verdict. Id. at 16. The address for ordering the above cited documents is:
[Vol. 16:799
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The medical malpractice crisis controversy is complex, involving
many issues; and the authors cannot attempt here to evaluate the
so-called crisis in its variations throughout the nation. However, a
historical perspective of the situation as it existed in Virginia in
the early 1970's will be provided.
A. The Perception of a Medical Malpractice Crisis
1. The St. Paul Position Paper-An Ultimatum
By 1975 St. Paul Fire and Marine Insurance Company, which
wrote and still writes policies for approximately eighty to ninety
percent of the Virginia physicians, 8 came forward with a position
paper entitled Preserving a Medical Malpractice Insurance, Mar-
ketplace: Problems and Remedies.2 9 The following is the authors'
synopsis of the major points made by St. Paul:
1. There was, without doubt, a medical malpractice insurance
crisis for insurers, for doctors, and for health care consumers."0
2. Under the then-current insurance system, doctors might be
unable to obtain coverage in 1975.31
3. In 1969 St. Paul had one claim pending for every twenty-three
doctors insured, but by 1974 the ratio had increased to one in
ten.3
2
4. The average value of a claim in 1969 for St. Paul policyholders
was $6,705.00, and by 1974 it had almost doubled to $12,534.00. 3
5. St. Paul, which insured some 48,000 out of 300,000 doctors
across the nation,' declared that it would "not write any new or
renewal policies except on a claims made basis after June 30,
1975."M5
6. Previously, St. Paul and other American insurers had been
selling an "occurrence" policy, which pays for settling claims aris-
The Rand Corporation, 1700 Main Street, Santa Monica, California 90406.
28. BURAUU OF INSURANCE, STATE CORP. COMM'N, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE IN VmRGINI THE
ScoPE AND SEVERFTY OF THE PROBLEM AND ALTERNATIVE SOLUTIONS 12 (November, 1975).
29. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., Preserving a Medical Malpractice Insurance Market-
place: Problems and Remedies (1976) (position paper).
30. Id. at 1.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 3.
35. Id. at 1.
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ing out of incidents which have occurred wile the policy is in force,
no matter when the claim is made. An occurrence policy might be
called a "pay-in-advance" policy in which its premiums are based
on claims expected to be reported in the future.3 6
7. A claims made policy is a "pay as you go" policy, covering
claims first made during the year the policy is in force. The insur-
ance company can price the risk a year at a time on known data
instead of predicting several years into the future, as with the oc-
currence policy.3 7
8. While St. Paul pushed for a claims made approach for the
time being, 8 it threatened that, unless there were drastic changes
in the tort system, the company could not predict or promise fu-
ture rates. While the claims made approach would alleviate the in-
surance pricing uncertainty and afford an insurance market, the
claims made policy would not "solve the fundamental malpractice
problem." 9
9. St. Paul insisted on sweeping changes in the tort system, simi-
lar to those advanced in automobile reparations: (a) binding arbi-
tration panels of doctors, lawyers and lay people to render deci-
sions on negligence and damages; (b) a return to the "locality" rule
to establish the accepted standard of medical practice in the defen-
dant's own community; (c) a shorter statute of limitations (two
years was suggested); (d) elimination of the ad damnum clause (the
dollar demand in the lawsuit); (e) elimination of the collateral
source rule which excludes evidence and consideration of other
benefits and services received by a plaintiff as a result of his inju-
ries; (f) limitation of the doctrine of informed consent to comply
with a locality rule; and (g) regulation of attorneys' contingent fees
according to a sliding scale with lower percentage fees on higher
awards or settlements.40
10. Nationally, in 1969, St. Paul claimed that it had experienced
a net loss of $5,507,198.41
11. In Virginia in the 1975 Rate Classification 1 (lower-risk spe-
cialities, such as psychiatrists, pediatricians, pathologists, radiolo-
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 1-2.
39. Id. at 2.
40. Id. at 7-10.
41. Id. at 3 of attached exhibits.
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gists, internists, allergists, dermatologists and hematologists), St.
Paul's rates for $100,000/$300,000 liability were $433 for this cov-
erage as opposed to $135 in 1970. For Class 5 (including higher-risk
specialities such as anesthesiologists, neurosurgeons, obstetrician/
gynecologists, orthopedic surgeons and plastic surgeons), the rate
as of January 1, 1975 was $2,728 as opposed to $824 for the same
coverage in 1970.42
12. The following ranking was listed for frequency of allegations
made for medical negligence: (a) surgical error, (b) post-operative
problems, (c) improper surgical procedure, (d) failure to diagnose
fracture, (e) improper treatment of fracture, (f) lack of supervisory
control, (g) drug side effects, (h) improper treatment - infection, (i)
birth related problems, and (j) lack of informed consent.4"
2. Actions Taken by Some Other Companies
As of 1975 the Argonaut Company cancelled the policies of a
large number of New York doctors and said that it would not re-
new the policies of some 4,000 California doctors as of May 1, 1975.
The Travelers Insurance Company declined to commit itself on re-
newal of several thousand policyholders in California. Additionally,
Argonaut said it would not renew the policies of some 500 doctors
in Idaho,44 and a bill was passed there to limit the malpractice lia-
bility of physicians, nurses, and hospitals to $100,000.41 Yet the in-
surance industry as a whole opposed both federal intervention and
elimination of the fault system. 6 Several states were identified as
apparently having serious "problems" as of March, 1975; notably
Virginia was not listed among those states.47
42. Id. at 5 of attached exhibits.
43. Id. at 6 of attached exhibits.
44. Letter from Douglas M. Smith to Thomas V. Monahan (March 14, 1975) (discussing
medical malpractice insurance problems nationally).
45. IDAHO CoDn §§ 39-4201 to -4213 (1977). The section was held unconstitutional in
Jones v. State Bd. of Medicine, No. 55527 (Fourth Judicial District of the State of Idaho,
Nov. 14, 1980). See also Jones v. State Ed. of Medicine, 97 Idaho 859, -, 555 P.2d 399, 410-
16 (1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 914 (1977) (remanding case for determination of whether
discrimination between those claims exceeding $150,000 and those with smaller claims bears
substantial relationship to reasonable state purpose).
46. Smith, supra note .44.
47. Id. Nineteen states were identified as apparently having serious problems as of
March, 1975: Alaska, Arkansas, California, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Maryland,
Michigan, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Pennsylvania, South Dakota,
Texas, West Virginia and Wisconsin.
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3. The Indiana Plan
In Indiana, the Patients' Compensation Act,48 introduced on be-
half of the Indiana Medical Association, limited attorneys' fees to
fifteen percent, limited the statute of limitations to six years in
infants' cases, abolished breach of contract as a basis of a cause of
action unless the agreement was in writing and signed by the doc-
tor, eliminated the ad damnum clause, established a patient com-
pensation fund for awards over $100,000, and established a
mandatory four-member panel consisting of three physicians and
one lawyer (who had no vote).49 This plan was endorsed by the
Virginia Medical Society on June 29, 1975.50
4. Insurance Rates in Virginia
The so-called medical malpractice crisis was widely publicized in
newspapers, magazines, professional and insurance journals. Physi-
cians, hospitals, insurance carriers, lobbyists and some lawyers de-
manded change in the procedure for malpractice claims. Neverthe-
less, in Virginia, St. Paul, which insured at least eighty percent of
Virginia's 5,000 to 5,500 practicing doctors,51 assured that it would
continue to cover any doctor belonging to the Virginia Medical So-
ciety. St. Paul claimed its Virginia rates were based exclusively on
the company's Virginia experience and not on the experience of
any other state. Specifically, St. Paul said its rates were based on
its differing experience in three areas of Virginia: northern Vir-
ginia, having the highest rate structure; central Virginia, the sec-
ond highest rate structure; and western Virginia, the lowest rate
structure.52 The crux of the problem in setting rates, according to
St. Paul, is the inherent difficulty in adequately projecting future
losses. Although these losses will not be paid until some future
date, they arise from the current year's medical practice.
St. Paul reported to the Virginia legislature that in its medical
malpractice lines in Virginia,53 it incurred a loss of $251,878 in
48. IND. CODE ANN. § 16-9.5-4-3 (Burns Cum. Supp. 1982).
49. Id.
50. Letter from Edward W. Taylor to William W. Eskridge (July 8, 1975) (reporting on
the Virginia Medical Society's vote and adoption of Indiana Plan).
51. BUREAU OF INSURANCE, supra note 28.
52. Id. at 12-15. According to a public statement issued by St. Paul, one out of every
eleven doctors in central Virginia had a lawsuit pending against him at some point in 1974.
53. In 1975, there were 6,868 physicians licensed to practice medicine in Virginia (5,000-
5,500 were actually engaged in practice). There were 5,891 short-term general and special
hospitals nationwide, and 118 hospitals in Virginia. BUREAU oF INSURANCE, STATE CORP.
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1972, a gain of $40,758 in 1971, a loss of $224,445 in 1970 and a loss
of $683,897 in 1969. 54 The company reported that the number of
claims in Virginia had increased from 78 in 1968 to 269 in 1974,
the frequency of claims per 100 doctors had increased from
2.3792% in 1968 to 6.5103% in 1974, and the severity of each
claim had increased from $6,792.31 in 1968 to $9,649.09 in 1974.55
B. Was There a Crisis in Virginia in 1976?
The General Assembly grounded the Medical Malpractice Act
and specifically the "cap" on two findings: (1) health care provid-
ers were finding it difficult to obtain medical malpractice insurance
with limits at affordable rates in excess of $750,000; and (2) the
insurance problem was causing both early retirements and refusal
of young people to enter medical careers."' The professional licens-
ing boards contacted by the authors were unable to furnish any
statistics regarding the loss and early retirement of health care
providers in Virginia. Official state statistics regarding the number
of licensed practitioners demonstrate that in every year from 1970
to 1981, the number of licensed physicians in Virginia has in-
creased. For instance, over that ten year period the number of li-
censed physicians increased from 6,125 in 1970-71 to 9,914 in 1975-
76 and finally 16,532 in 1980-81. 57 This is the same time period in
which health care providers claimed that the threat of the so-called
crisis had driven individuals out of the profession.
COMM'N, DIsTRIBUTIoN (1976) (quoting AmEICAN Hosp. ASS'N ANNUAL SuRVEY, HosPrrAL
STATISTICS (1974 ed.) and DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, EDUC. AND WELFARE, STATISTICAL AB-
sTRACT 1974; PHYSICIAN VIsrrs, VOLUME AND INTERVAL U.S. 1971, VITAL AND HEALTH STATIS-
TICS, SERIES 10, No. 97 (1974)) [hereinafter cited as DISTRmUTION]. This report was distrib-
uted at the 1976 session of the Virginia General Assembly. See BUREAU OF INSURANCE, supra
note 28, at 5, 11-12.
54. St. Paul Fire and Marine Ins. Co., Experience of St. Paul Fire and Marine Insurance
Company: Physicians and Surgeons Professional Liability: Virginia Fund Analysis by Acci-
dent Year; Frequency-Severity by Reported Year (1976) (printed handouts distributed to
the 1976 Virginia General Assembly).
55. Id.
56. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
57. Letter from Ola M. Ferguson, Department of Health Regulatory Boards, State Board
of Medicine, Commonwealth of Virginia, to Beale, Eichner, Wright, Denton & Shields, P.C.
(March 16, 1981) (listing number of physicians licensed to practice in Virginia from 1970-
1981). Furthermore the number of licensed osteopaths, podiatrists, chiropracters, clinical
psychologists, physical therapists and physical therapy assistants has also increased during
1970 to 1980. Although the number of licensed practitioners in nursing has decreased on
several occasions, the number of nurses licensed to practice in Virginia has increased from
32,245 in 1970 to 59,354 in 1981.
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The remaining legislative justification for the "cap" given by the
1976 General Assembly in its preamble was the alleged increasing
difficulty that Virginia health care providers were experiencing in
obtaining medical malpractice insurance at affordable rates with
limits in excess of $750,000. However, Garland L. Hazelwood, Jr.,
Assistant Commissioner of Insurance for the Virginia State Corpo-
ration Commission, later testified under oath that there was never
any insurance availability problem with respect to Virginia physi-
cians.58 He defined crisis as an "unavailability" of professional lia-
bility insurance. 9 Any problem Hazelwood saw during 1974 and
1975 dealt with the availability of insurance for hospitals and the
problem which existed for hospitals only concerned coverage for
the basic limits. 6 ° That is, the hospital, he said, was experiencing
some difficulty in obtaining the primary coverage for the first
$300,000. However, there was never a lack of availability of cover-
age for limits over $750,000, even for hospitals.6 1
Furthermore, according to Hazelwood, malpractice insurance
policies were never keyed to a $750,000 limit. Policies were written
for either limits of $100,000/$300,000 or for $1,000,000. Most St.
Paul policies today are written for the latter amount. None are
known to be written for $750,000. It is clear that $750,000 is a
figure pulled out of the air by the 1976 legislature and is com-
pletely unrelated to any actual examinations, studies, insurance
policies, statistics or figures. This limit is a classic example of a
great deal of argument, noise and clamor made by powerful citi-
zens which resulted in hurried legislation that did not fully con-
sider its widespread repercussions.
It is also interesting to observe that St. Paul's claims experience
in its medical malpractice line had leveled off in Virginia and many
other states during 1975.62 Normally, this fact would have triggered
a timely rate filing by St. Paul during the following year, 1976.
Such a filing would have promptly informed the Insurance Bureau
58. Riggan v. Nassef, No. 42-5769 (Cir. Ct. County of Halifax, Va., Dec. 17, 1981) (deposi-
tion of Garland L. Hazelwood, Jr., at 5).
59. Id.
60. Id. at 8-9.
61. Case No. 19672 before the State Corp. Commission (March 26, 1976) (testimony of
Warren Bessler, Resident General Counsel for St. Paul). An exhibit filed at that hearing
showed that only 12 hospitals in Virginia claimed any renewal problems.
62. Letter from M.W. Harnish, State Filings Director, Insurance Law Department for St.
Paul, to John G. Day, Commissioner, Insurance Commission of Virginia (Oct. 19, 1976)
(available in the State Corporation Commission's file on St. Paul).
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of the 1975 claims experience, a fact which may have had some
influence on the 1976 legislature.6 3 The legislature in 1976 did not
have the benefit of this information as St. Paul's rate filing for that
year was delayed.6 '
C. Responses to the Perceived Crisis
1. Association of Trial Lawyers of America
In April, 1975, the Association of Trial Lawyers of America
(ATLA) reported that the medical malpractice problem had been
blown out of proportion and developed into an emotional issue.65
In ATLA's view, all the existing medical propaganda concentrated
on the interests of doctors, lawyers and insurance companies, while
the rights and welfare of the medical malpractice victim had been
subordinate and forgotten. ATLA believed that this resulting mal-
practice immunity breeds irresponsibility.
Robert E. Cartright, President of ATLA, noted that, in 1974, the
average annual premium for medical malpractice insurance was
$3,500 for each of California's forty thousand practicing doctors,
totalling $140,000,000.6 However, insurance payments that year
only totaled $30,000,000 or $750 per doctor.67 Cartright questioned
the $110,000,000 difference and suggested the need for a full public
investigation of insurance company practices.6 "
In June, 1981, ATLA announced that 5,500 southern California
doctors had reached a settlement in their suit against The Trav-
elers Insurance Company which alleged that the doctors had been
overcharged by a sudden premium hike of 327% in 1976.69 Trav-
elers agreed to pay the doctors $18,600,000 immediately as reim-
bursement for overcharges, and to make additional payments over
the next nine years calculated as the difference between projected
claims and actual claims; the total figure could reach almost
$50,000,000.70 ATLA described this settlement as a tacit admission
63. The Virginia Medical Malpractice Act was adopted April 9, 1976.
64. Letter, supra note 62.
65. 18 A. TmAI LAW. Am. NEWSLETrER No. 3, 102-03 (1977).
66. Id.
67. Id. at 102. The $30 million figure broke down to $7.7 million in verdicts and $22.3
million in settlements.
68. Id. at 103.
69. Southern Cal. Physicians Council Corp. v. Phoenix Ins. Co., No. C-35076 (Cal. App.
Dep't Super. Ct., filed Feb. 4, 1981).
70. 24 A. TRuIL LAW. AM. REP. No. 5,194-95 (1981).
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that the crisis had been contrived.71
2. Medical Society of Virginia
The Virginia Medical Society, in a report72 to its membership at
its annual meeting in October, 1975, claimed that there was no
more urgent consumer problem facing the Virginia General Assem-
bly in its 1976 session than the impending crisis in medical mal-
practice insurance. This crisis was said to affect not only physi-
cians, hospitals and other health care providers, but also every
resident of our state who requires health care. In a well-planned
and well-orchestrated campaign, the Medical Society reported that
it had developed a Medical Malpractice Insurance Relief Program
for consideration and passage in the 1976 General Assembly. The
Society reported that, while Virginia's current malpractice insur-
ance difficulties had not reached crisis proportion, expert opinion
was that within twelve to eighteen months coverage could be with-
drawn.7 3 The Medical Society admitted that the solution to this
problem is a complex one, and recommended that immediate ac-
tion be taken to reduce the frequency and severity of malpractice
claims in Virginia." The main features of the Virginia Medical So-
ciety proposal included: (1) a $500,000 limitation on total recovery
for a patient suffering injury or death with a $100,000 cap per phy-
sician or hospital involved; (2) for minors, limitation on the period
of liability to six years within the date of the alleged malpractice;
(3) creation of a patient's compensation fund financed by a
surcharge on premiums paid by health care providers; (4) a limita-
tion, fifteen percent after the first $100,000 awarded, of an attor-
ney's fee made from the patient's compensation fund; (5) review of
qualifications for fitness and possible disciplinary action by the ap-
propriate licensing board of a health care provider who loses a mal-
practice suit; (6) establishment of a risk management authority to
make insurance available to health care providers rejected by other
insurers; (7) establishment of a medical review panel to review all
malpractice claims before court action is commenced; and (8) use
of binding arbitration as an alternative to adjudication in court. 5
71. Id. at 196.
72. REPORT TO THE MEMBERSHIP ON MEDICAL MALPRACTICE INSURANCE (October,
1975)(pamphlet distributed at the Annual Meeting of the Medical Society of Virginia, Roa-
noke, Virginia (Oct. 23-26, 1975)).
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id.
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A professional public affairs firm participated in the medical mal-
practice insurance relief campaign launched by the Medical Soci-
ety. Activities included: (1) a survey of public attitudes in Virginia
on the medical malpractice problem; (2) mobilization of physicians
and other health care providers and assistance in their preparation
of testimony before regional hearings being held throughout the
state by the House Sub-Committee on Medical Malpractice; (3)
polls of members and candidates for the General Assembly; (4) the
publication of special newsletters to keep its leadership informed
about the problem; (5) in depth research on the issue; (6) contact
with influential groups and associations around the state to seek
support for the proposal; and (7) development of materials to as-
sist physicians in waging the campaign in their communities.76
A public relations campaign was mounted on the grassroots level
by physicians seeking public support for their position. Local dele-
gates and senators were contacted; public forums for discussion of
the problems including Lion's Clubs, Rotary and Jaycees were
solicited; local newspaper editors were visited by the physicians;
articulate physician spokesmen were encouraged to speak on the
topic; and a letter writing campaign to patients and friends was
mounted urging them to write to their delegates and senators to
support the Medical Society's plan. The end result was House Bill
190 and Senate Bill 114, which included the Medical Society's ver-
sion of the Indiana Plan sponsored by the Indiana State Medical
Association and adopted there April 3, 1975.77 Many of the defini-
tions included in the Virginia version closely track the language of
the Indiana Plan.
3. Virginia State Bar
The Virginia State Bar, in a position paper presented to the
1976 General Assembly, concluded that "currently, there is no mal-
practice crisis in Virginia."78 In support of its contention that the
references to "astronomical" insurance rates in Virginia were mis-
leading, the State Bar reported that malpractice insurance rates in
Virginia then ranked twenty-ninth in the nation.m In addition, the
State Bar reported that, contrary to popular belief, Virginia juries
were not generously awarding recoveries to plaintiffs against doc-
76. Id.
77. H. 190, S. 114 Va. Gen. Assem. (1975).
78. Virginia State Bar, Statement on Medical Malpractice (1976).
79. Id. at 1.
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tors. Instead, St. Paul's local claims manager had reported recently
that there had not been a jury verdict against a physician in cen-
tral Virginia in over five years.8 0 The State Bar reported that St.
Paul's chief trial counsel in the central Virginia area often had
been heard to say that he had never lost a malpractice case.8 1 The
paper concluded that insurance coverage was currently available
and that Virginia law served to protect the interest of health care
providers. The State Bar charged that the crisis in other states had
been precipitated, in large part, justifiably or not, by the insurance
industry. 2 It pointed out that the President of Argonaut Insurance
Company, in testifying before the New York State Legislature, and
said that Argonaut had paid out only $24,000 in claims although it
had collected $35,000,000 in premiums.83 The company requested a
premium increase based on actuarial speculation that there would
be increased claims. The Bar reported, however, that there was
precedent in Virginia to indicate that convoluted actuarial meth-
ods can demonstrate loss where there is, in fact, a gain." It main-
tained that, currently, no satisfactory justification had been offered
for providing the physician with special immunity or special rules
of law for his sole protection.8 5
4. Virginia Ad Hoc Committee of Attorneys
As a result of the so-called crisis, the bar groups of Virginia ap-
pointed the Virginia Ad Hoc Committee on Medical Malpractice in
1975. The Committee was comprised of two members from the Old
Dominion Bar Association and four members from each of the fol-
lowing: the Virginia State Bar, the Virginia Bar Association and
the Virginia Trial Lawyers Association."8
The Ad Hoc Committee reported its desire that the impact on
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 4.
83. Id. at 5.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 7.
86. Representing the Virginia State Bar were: Wilbur C. Allen, Clarence Flippo Hicks,
Jackson L. Kiser and T.J. Markow; representing the Virginia Bar Association, Edward W.
Taylor, Morton B. Spiro, John E. Clarkson and William W. Eskridge; representing the Vir-
ginia Trial Lawyers Association, Emanuel Emroch, Kenneth E. Trabue, Willard J. Moody
and Marvin F. Cole (chairman); representing the Old Dominion Bar Association, George
Minor, Jr. and Thomas L. Hicks, Jr. The Committee was completely unfunded and without
any supporting staff. Some members of the Committee regularly represented St. Paul in
defense of claims.
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the patient seriously be considered by the General Assembly. This
Committee believed that the solution to the medical malpractice
problem was the elimination of malpractice itself and could be
achieved by attacking the cause, incompetent practice, and im-
proving the quality of health care. It was the unanimous opinion of
the Ad Hoc Committee that all three bills, Senate Bills 114 and
115 and House Bill 190, then pending in the Virginia Legislature,
be opposed in their entirety on constitutional grounds.87 However,
the Committee did support Senate Bill 122 which would establish
a Medical Malpractice Joint Underwriting Association.8
D. The SCC's Insurance Bureau Study: The John Day Report
On February 6, 1975, the Virginia General Assembly adopted
House Joint Resolution No. 174, which authorized the Commission
to study costs in the administration of health care services and to
study and report on malpractice insurance premiums for physi-
cians. The Commission was directed to examine the possibility of
requiring companies furnishing insurance in Virginia to base their
malpractice insurance premiums on Virginia experience only.8 9
In November, 1975, the State Corporation Commission's Bureau
of Insurance completed its study on medical malpractice insurance
in Virginia.90 It reported that since 1960, malpractice insurance
premium rates across the United States had increased more than
1,000 % due to the dramatic increase in the number and severity of
malpractice claims.9 1 It was estimated that over ninety percent of
all medical malpractice claims made in the United States had been
reported since 1965.92 It reported that Virginia had begun to expe-
rience similar problems, although not to the degree experienced in
many other jurisdictions. The annual premium for the minimum
$100,000/$300,000 coverage for Virginia physicians under the Med-
ical Society's program ranked only twenty-ninth in the nation.93
In July, 1975, then Insurance Commissioner John Day told the
legislative study commission on malpractice insurance that the
87. Ad Hoc Committee on Medical Malpractice, Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on
Medical Malpractice (adopted Jan. 9, 1976).
88. Id.
89. H.R. Res. 174, Va. Gen. Assem. (1975).
90. BuREmu OF INSURANCE, supra note 28.
91. Id. and DisTRmUTON, supra note 53.
92. Id.
93. Id.
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availability of malpractice insurance was not yet a problem in Vir-
ginia. 4 Most Virginia doctors were still able to obtain the same
coverage they had been receiving, new doctors were able to obtain
coverage, and with several exceptions, insurance was still available
to the state's acute care hospitals.9 Day reported that his office
had requested that insurance companies maintain the "status quo"
until the 1976 meeting of the General Assembly with respect to
hospitals that were threatened with the prospect of losing cover-
age. 6 Day urged that the legislature explore the matter of ensuring
continued availability of malpractice insurance. He suggested that
a possible vehicle for accomplishing this goal would be for the leg-
islature to establish a joint underwriting association through which
liability insurers in the state could participate in the drafting of
their own malpractice policies. 97 Day explained that the malprac-
tice insurance problem was the result of increasing medical claims
and difficulties in predicting the number and severity of the
claims.
In November, 1975, John Day presented a statement to the
House and Senate Courts of Justice Committees regarding the
State Corporation Commission's Medical Malpractice Report,98 in
which he reiterated that there were few problems regarding the
availability of malpractice insurance. He attributed this to St. Paul
Fire and Marine Insurance Company's continued willingness to re-
main in the Virginia area, because problems experienced in other
parts of the country did not exist in Virginia at that time and were
not expected in the foreseeable future.9 Reporting on the recom-
mendations of the State Corporation Commission, Day suggested
that a joint underwriting association be established and stated:
With respect to the reduction of claims and the size of claims, the
Commission analyzes various means by which the medical discipli-
nary system can be strengthened .... Based on this review and a
review of the Virginia experience, the SCC believes that caution is
warranted. This is so for several reasons. First, most of the legal
doctrines complained of elsewhere are virtually non-existent in Vir-
94. Richmond Times Dispatch, July 12, 1975, § B, at 1, col. 2 and § B, at 2, col. 6.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Day, Medical Malpractice Insurance: Insurance Commissioner Proposes New Con-
cept, 24 VA. B. NEWs, No. 3, at 19 (1975).
99. Id. at 19.
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ginia. In fact, many of Virginia's existing legal doctrines are more
restrictive than the changes that have been made in other jurisdic-
tions to remedy the problem ....
.. . The best available evidence to date indicates that at least
75% of all malpractice incidents caused by physicians and surgeons
occurs within he confines of a hospital ....
. . . Because of these considerations, the SCC thought that some
effort should be made to look at the possible solutions that focus on
the hospital-an emphasis that up until recently has been non-
existent .... oo
Day reported that one alternative would be for the hospital to be
held responsible for all losses resulting from incidents occurring
within the hospital.110 To accomplish this, the hospital would
purchase insurance to cover all losses and redistribute this cost
through the per diem rate.102 It was believed that this redistribu-
tion of cost would decrease the burden placed upon the individual
physician and ultimately, the patient. 0 3 This program would pro-
vide incentive for doctors and hospitals to cooperate in improving
the overall quality of patient care and providing some type of qual-
ity control.
The proposals offered by Day to the study commission went
largely unheeded.0' The Medical Society, as evidenced by public
relations and lobbying activity expenditures, was determined to
enact the Indiana Plan. The insurance industry, on the other hand,
maintained a low profile. St. Paul had already announced that be-
cause of its claims made policy, it would continue to write coverage
for Virginia's physicians. The proposed joint underwiring associa-
tion would, therefore, be unnecessary.
Despite the proposals of John Day and the Insurance Commis-
sion Report, Virginia doctors, legislators and lobbyists were af-
fected by the state of frenzy generated by the public relations cam-
paign. The General Assembly passed sweeping changes in Virginia
medical malpractice law because of panic and a feeling that the
100. Id. at 19-21.
101. Id. at 22.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Senator Edward E. Willey, a retired pharmacist and former owner of a drug com-
pany, was chairman of the Commission, Katherine L. Goolsby was staff attorney to the
Commission. It is perhaps worthy of note that Goolsby's husband, Allen C. Goolsby, III, was
a lobbyist for the Virginia Medical Society.
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tort law must be changed.
E. Passage of the Medical Malpractice Act in Virginia
On February 19, 1976, Senate Document Number 29 entitled In-
terim Report of the Commission to Study the Costs and Adminis-
tration of Health Care Services to the Governor and the General
Assembly of Virginia was distributed. This document incorporated
much of the information contained in the Insurance Commission
Report of November, 1975.
Senate Bill Number 115, offered on January 26, 1976, was
amended in the nature of a substitute by a unanimous Senate on
February 17, 1976. The amendment deleted portions of the original
Bill which imposed a $100,000 ceiling per claim against a health
care provider and a total limitation of $500,000. Portions forbid-
ding actions for breach of contract, imposing a six-year limitation
on infants' claims, establishing a patient's compensation fund, im-
posing a limit on attorneys' fees, establishing a residual malprac-
tice insurance authority, and declaring the existence of an emer-
gency also were eliminated.
The House prepared its own amendment in the nature of a sub-
stitute for Senate Bill 115. This substitute contained language re-
garding limitations on recovery for pain and suffering. The House
version required that part of an award attributable to physical im-
pairment and pain and suffering be limited to $250,000. A parent,
guardian or other person standing in loco parentis to an infant
would have the right to recover any expenses incurred in an at-
tempt to cure the infant. More importantly, the House inserted a
severability clause in case any part of the Act should be held
unconstitutional.
The total amount recoverable was increased to $750,000, while
the pain and suffering limitation was set at $250,000 by a floor
amendment to the House version of the Bill. Although the House
passed the Bill as amended, the Senate flatly rejected the amend-
ment. It was clear at this point that battle lines had been drawn
between the Senate and the House regarding a ceiling or cap on
recovery. The resulting Committee of Conferences on Senate Bill
115 agreed on what would become the preamble to Chapter 611 of
the Acts of Assembly which has previously been discussed. The
Committee agreed on the final language: "[T]he total amount re-
coverable for an injury to, or death of, a patient shall not exceed
[Vol. 16:799
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$750,000."105 However, the severability language insisted upon by
the House and the language in the title of the original House ver-
sion of the Bill placing the limitation "on recovery for pain and
suffering" remained in the final version as it passed both houses.
F. Factors Mitigating Against the Need for a Limitation on Re-
covery in Virginia
1. Insurance Commission Makes No Recommendation with Ref-
erence To Limit on Recovery
The number of legislative members who had an opportunity to
read Senate Document No. 29, first printed after February 19,
1976, is debatable. Nevertheless, it is clear that Senate Document
No. 29 contained a definitive study of the problem as it then ex-
isted and its conclusions were in opposition to the ultimate legisla-
tive action. The Commission made no tort system recommenda-
tions regarding the statute of limitations, the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur, the doctrine of informed consent, the locality rule gov-
erning the standard of care which doctors must exercise, contin-
gent fees, or the imposition of the monetary limit on the liability of
health care providers. The Commission did recognize that the
above matters were the subject of consideration by other legislative
studies and did recommend tort system changes relating to the ad
damnum clause, the collateral source rule and the review of mal-
practice claims by screening panels.106 The Commission found the
State Corporation Commission's hospital-based distribution propo-
sal noteworthy, concluding that it offered the greatest possibility of
a rational and effective solution to the problem. 107 It is clear that
most members of the legislature had not read this report, for had
they done so, they would have found that there was little need to
impose a monetary limit on recovery in malpractice actions in
Virginia.
As previously noted, the Insurance Commission reported that
malpractice insurance coverage was available in Virginia to both
physicians and hospitals.108 This report demonstrated that St.
105. 1976 Va. Acts, ch. 611.
106. CoMMIssIoN TO STUDY THE COSTS AND ADMINSTRATION OF HEALTH CARE SERVICES,
INTERIM REPORT TO THE GOVERNOR AND THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF VIRGINIA OF 1976, S. Doc.
No. 29, at 7 (1976).
107. Id. at 8.
108. S. Doc. No. 29, supra note 106, Exhibit 1, Medical Malpractice Insurance in Vir-
ginia: The Scope and Severity of the Problem and Alternative Solutions, at 9-10.
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Paul, through its agreement with the Virginia Medical Society, had
written at least eighty percent of all Virginia physicians' policies
since 1956.109 Although the claims, as recorded by St. Paul, had
increased from 89 in 1969 to 151 during the first half of 1975,110 St.
Paul, continued to insure approximately eighty percent of Vir-
ginia's practicing physicians. Such figures do not reflect the exis-
tence of a crisis. Further, the average value of a claim was
$4,182.03 in 1969 and $10,190.66 in 1975.111 This approximated the
national experience for 1968 and 1974.112 The increased claim
figures for the periods 1968 and 1975 in Virginia and for the peri-
ods 1968 and 1974 across the nation, offered little support for the
imposition of a limitation on recovery.
2. Charitable Immunity Exception
The Bureau of Insurance of the State Corporation Commission
Report also pointed out that, prior to 1974, more than seventy per-
cent of Virginia hospitals were exempt from malpractice liability
because of the charitable immunity doctrine. 3 Even though
amendments were made to the Virginia Code in 19764 providing
for immunity to institutions which are exempt from federal taxa-
tion and the elimination of the words "charitable institution" from
the amended Code section, approximately seventy percent of Vir-
ginia hospitals remain exempt from malpractice liability for dam-
ages greater than $100,000 unless they voluntarily carry higher in-
surance limits.""'
Claims against "for profit" hospitals in Virginia had increased
from eleven in 1969 to sixty-eight for the first three quarters of
1975.116 Claims against "not for profit" and state and local govern-
ment hospitals increased from twenty-one in 1969 to ninety-eight
for the first thred quarters of 1975.117 This was hardly an alarming
occurrence in view of the fact that the latter group had approxi-
mately 4.6 million bed-patient days and the former group had 0.8
109. Id. at 18.
110. Id. at 19.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 20.
113. Id. at 5.
114. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-38 (Repl. Vol. 1977).
115. BUREAU OF INSURANCE, supra note 28, at 23.
116. Id.
117. Id.
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million bed-patients days.11 More importantly, it was noted that
seventy-five percent of all malpractice acts of physicians and sur-
geons occur within the confines of a hospital;119 involve special-
ists;120 and that, "prior to 1975, Virginia hospitals encountered lit-
tle or no difficulty in obtaining malpractice insurance. "121
3. Virginia's Short Statute of Limitation
With respect to the impact of Virginia's short statute of limita-
tions, the Insurance Commissson reported that "many states -
particularly those having a severe malpractice problem - afford
the claimant a much longer time within which he can bring
suit. 1 22 "With respect to physicians and surgeons, Virginia's short
staute of limitations appears to result in a relatively rapid report-
ing of malpractice claims when compared to the nation as a whole
"123
4. Modest Payouts by Insurance Carriers
For the years 1969 through 1974, the report indicated that, in
Virginia, St. Paul had a total of one hundred two claims again phy-
sicians; paid ninety; and paid out, or "reserved," $1,307,243 for loss
and "loss expense" anticipated for the five year period involved.1 24
Additional data for 1969 indicated that of eighty-four claims made
against Virginia hospitals, seventy-seven had been paid, and a total
of $136,786 had been paid out, or "reserved," for loss and "loss
expense" by all other hospital insurance carriers.1 25 These were
hardly alarming figures.
5. Small Jury Verdicts in Virginia
With respect to the size of verdicts in Virginia in medical mal-
practice cases, the Insurance Commission reported that "[w]hile
extremely large verdicts or settlements may be a severe problem in
other jurisdictions, available data indicates that verdict or settle-
ment size has not yet reached crisis proportions in Virginia. 1 28 Be-
118. Id. at 22.
119. Id. at 28.
120. Id. at 29.
121. Id. at 10.
122. Id. at 24.
123. Id. at 25.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 26.
126. Id. at 27.
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tween 1970 and the beginning of 1975 there was only one claim
paid in Virginia which fell within the range of $250,000 to
$449,999, and no claims were paid in excess of $500,000. Only one
claim fell within the range of $150,000 to $249,999. Five claims
during this five year period fell between $100,000 and $149,999.11"
G. Insurance Commission Solutions
The Insurance Commission reported that there were three possi-
ble solutions to the problems of malpractice coverage:
(1) A hospital and/or physician-owned insurance company; (2) A
state insurance fund operated by the state itself or by an insurance
carrier selected by the state to manage the fund; and (3) A combina-
tion of private insurance carriers that are compelled to provide mal-
practice insurance coverage with provision for the distribution of re-
sulting losses or gains among the participating insurance
companies.""
1. Reciprocal Insurance Companies
With respect to a hospital or physician-owned insurance com-
pany, "[a]vailability of coverage is assured because doctors and
hospitals would have control over the insurance company."2
Under insurance law existing in 1975, "such a company could be
established in Virginia."1 30 It is assumed that, largely because of
the report's recommended alternative, the Virginia Hospital Insur-
ance Reciprocal was formed in 1977; however, to date, no
equivalent has been formed for individual physicians.
In 1979, the Virginia Hospital Reciprocal announced that it was
the largest writer of insurance for hospitals in Virginia, represent-
ing over sixty-five percent of the licensed hospital beds in the
Commonwealth."3 I The Virginia Hospital Reciprocal successfully
increased its assets from $4,891,018 in 1978 to $10,143,618 in
1979.132 With respect to any possible future "crisis" in hospital in-
surance, the Reciprocal reported that "[w]e have taken great care
to ensure that our Reciprocal is properly structured, adequately re-
127. Id. at 28.
128. Id. at 36.
129. Id. at 37.
130. Id.
131. VIRGINIA Hosp. INS. RECIPROCAL, 1979 ANNUAL REPORT 4 (1980).
132. Id. at 1.
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served and financially sound so as to be able to withstand whatever
the future may hold."1 3
As of 1975 a number of Virginia physicians were actively pursu-
ing the alternative of forming a reciprocal. They decided that their
company would not become operative unless approximately 1200
doctors elected to participate.134 To date, there has been no indica-
tion that a physicians' reciprocal insurance company has been
formed, possibly because St. Paul has continued to insure approxi-
mately eighty percent or more of Virginia physicians through its
relationship with the Virginia Medical Society.135
2. State Fund Approach
With respect to the alternative of establishing a state fund,
staffed by state employees, to provide malpractice insurance cover-
age, the Insurance Commission maintained that there would be
cost savings. These savings would result from the elimination of
agents' commissions and duplicative management, and the spread
of losses among the entire population through the tax base rather
than among policyholders, as occurs in the private sector. How-
ever, it was noted that only a few states had thus far adopted the
state fund approach.136 As far as this writer is aware, the 1976 Gen-
eral Assembly never seriously considered this suggestion.
3. The Joint Underwriting Association
The Insurance Commission's third alternative involved the for-
mation of a Joint Underwriting Association (JUA) or a reinsurance
facility. Under this format, insurance companies engaged in writing
specified types of policies
would be required to form an association which would issue mal-
practice insurance coverage to all health care providers in accor-
dance with underwriting standards established by legislation or by
the Commissioner of Insurance. All losses or profits would be dis-
tributed among participating insurance companies in accordance
with an equitable formula usually based on the premium volume
that each company writes in the state. This standby mechanism
would be activated by the Commissioner of Insurance whenever he
133. Id. at 2.
134. BuREAu OF INsuRANcE, supra note 28, at 38.
135. Id. at 12.
136. Id. at 40.
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found, after a hearing, that malpractice insurance is not readily
available through the voluntary market. The JUA would be man-
aged by a single carrier with malpractice experience selected by the
participating insurance companies in accordance with a plan of op-
eration approved by the Commissioner of Insurance." s'
It was noted that
[t]he vast majority of jurisdictions have opted for the JUA alterna-
tive rather than the reinsurance facility because ... [u]nder a reinsur-
ance facility, all companies required to write malpractice insurance
must service the policy sold by them even though the risk is rein-
sured with the facility. Since the vast majority of companies have no
expertise in the malpractice area, each company would be required
to either obtain staff with this experience or to rely on independnet
claims adjusters. 138
As this article later discusses, the JUA, while temporarily imple-
mented for hospitals prior to the formation of the Virginia Hospi-
tal Reciprocal, was never implemented for physicians because the
Virginia Medical Society never requested it." 9
The Medical Malpractice Joint Underwriting Association was
enacted by the 1976 General Assembly.'40 The statute provided
that the JUA was to be in effect until July 1, 1980 and further
provided that "the [Joint Underwriting] [A]ssociation shall not
commence underwriting operations . . . until the [State Corpora-
tion] Commission, after investigation and a hearing, has deter-
mined that medical malpractice insurance cannot be made reason-
ably available for a significant number of any class, type or group
of providers of health care in the voluntary market.' 14' The Code
also provided for automatic dissolution of the JUA. After July 1,
1980, while the JUA remains in existence, "[t]he Association shall
discontinue its underwriting operations and shall remain in exis-
tence for the sole purpose of completing its orderly dissolution.' 42
It further states that "[w]hen the Commission finds that Associa-
tion has met its obligations incident to termination of its business
137. Id. at 42.
138. Id. at 43.
139. Riggan v. Nassef, No. 42-5769 (Cir. Ct. County of Halifax, Va., Dec. 17, 1981) (depo-
sition of Garland L. Hazelwood, Jr., at 34).
140. VA. CODE ANN. § 38.1-776 (Repl. Vol. 1981).
141. Id. § 38.1-776(C).
142. Id. § 38.1-776.1(1).
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affairs, the Commission shall by order issue a Certificate of Disso-
lution and the existence of the Association shall cease. ' 143 The
Corporation Commission shall also "be empowered to reactivate
the joint underwriting association should it find that medical mal-
practice insurance cannot be made reasonably available in the vol-
untary market. .. .
At a hearing before the State Corporation Commission in March,
1976, the hospital group requested that the JUA be implemented
as to its members. The physicians made no similar appearance
before the Corporation Commission. The JUA has done no busi-
ness in Virginia since 1977.145
III. MALPRACTICE CLAIMS AND AMOUNTS OF RECOVERY FOLLOWING
PASSAGE OF THE ACT
A. Jury Verdict Trends in Medical Malpractice Cases
While amounts of damage awards in medical and hospital negli-
gence actions have increased in recent years, the number of jury
verdicts in favor of plaintiffs has decreased to the point that ver-
dicts are returned for plaintiffs in less than one-third of all
cases. 148 According to a 1977 jury verdict research release (JVR)
covering 1966 through 1971, of 540 cases collected, plaintiffs had
an overall recovery rate against physicians of only 33%. Between
1971 and 1977, of the 783 cases studied, the recovery rate fell to
28%, a decrease of 15% of the 1971 rate. Of all liability situations,
comparatively speaking, medical malpractice results in the lowest
overall plaintiff recovery rate.147 JVR also reported that plaintiffs
in suits against hospitals have steadily been losing ground in recov-
ery probabilities. In 1977, plaintiffs were found to be recovering
against hospitals in only 46% of the cases as compared with 52%
in 1971 and 53% from 1960 through 1965.141
Indications are that the number of liability suits against all pro-
fessionals, including lawyers, engineers, veterinarians, bankers, chi-
ropractors, dentists, and psychologists, has increased in the last
143. Id. § 38.1-776.1(3).
144. Id. § 38.1-776.2.
145. Riggan v. Nassef, No. 42-5769 (deposition of Hazelwood at 16).
146. JURY VERDICT RESEARCH, INC., 3A PERSONAL INJURY VALUATION HANDBOOKS, No. 204,
at 684 (1977).
147. Id., No. 202 at 655.
148. Id., No. 203, at 668.
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few years.14 9 The overall plaintiff recovery rate, in all situations,
including automobile collisions, was reported by the 1977 study to
be apppoximately 65%.150 It should also be kept in mind that
damage awards in all types of personal injury cases have increased
in recent years. This fact may be explained by reference to the
consumer price index increase. Awards on an annual basis since
1973 have increased each year an average of 10.23 %, while the con-
sumer price index has increased each year an average of 8.9%.151
In addition, the number of million dollar verdicts in all types of
cases has increased in recent years. While these awards may ap-
pear unreasonable at first glance, they are generally made only to
seriously injured plaintiffs; and the jury's decision to grant such a
verdict is usually based upon testimony presenting legitimate com-
putations of both the plaintiffs projected lost earnings and the
projected medical expenses necessary to sustain him for life. Ac-
cording to JVR's latest report there has been a total of 536 verdicts
of $1,000,000 or more in all types of cases since 1962, when the first
seven figure verdict was returned.152 JVR has classed Virginia
among those states with the fewest $1,000,000 awards and in a
class where there were only between one and four such awards in
all types of cases.153
Of all $1,000,000 awards in the nineteen-year span covered by
the report, 231 (or 43%) fell into one of two liability categories:
products liability or medical malpractice. One hundred and forty
of these high awards were in products liability cases (26%) and 91
(17%) were returned in medical malpractice suits.1 " Conversely,
automobile collision cases resulted in million dollar verdicts in only
68 (or less than 13 %) of all such awards. Injuries suffered by plain-
tiffs in all million dollar suits included permanent paralysis, per-
manent brain damage, wrongful death, amputation of a limb and
severe disabling burns.155
The first verdict of $1,000,000 or more in a medical negligence
case was recorded in 1971 and there has been a total of 74 during
149. Id., No. 201, at 645.
150. Id., No. 202, at 656.
151. JURY VERDICT RESEARCH, INC., 1 PERSONAL INJURY VALUATION HANDBOOKS, No. 258,
at 6 (1982).
152. Id. at 11.
153. Id. at 13.
154. Id. at 14.
155. Id.
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the period from 1972 to 1980.156 Excluding the $1,000,000 verdicts,
the average verdict nationwide in medical negligence cases during
the year 1981 was $220,068 with a mid-point verdict of $175,000
compared with an average verdict in 1971 of $153,974 and a mid-
point of $72,500.1"
B. SCC Statistics Between 1976 and 1981
Between 1976 and 1981 there were 2,676 medical malpractice
claims in Virginia against hospitals, physicians or other health care
providers. 158 Approximately 74% of the claims made arose from in-
juries incurred in a hospital-type setting. In slightly more than
one-fourth (700) of these claims, some indemnity was paid by the
carriers, whereas no payment was made to the remainder of the
claimants. 159 In only 32 claims (1.5% of the total), was there pay-
ment in excess of $100,000.16° Even though 22% (589) of all claims
were made for paralysis, loss of more than one limb, brain damage,
or death, insurers paid out more than $25,000 in only 141 claims.161
In more than three-fourths (77.9%) of all cases, no attorney's fee
was paid to the plaintiff's attorney, whereas in 19.9% of the cases,
there was an attorney's fee of between one dollar and $25,000 paid
to the plaintiff's attorney.6 2
C. Insurance Payouts Versus Company Earnings in the Late
Seventies
In 1977, St. Paul reported to the State Corporation Commission
that for that year it had earned premiums in Virginia in its medi-
cal malpractice lines of $14,731,607 and that it had paid $226,836
in claims. 16 3 For 1978, St. Paul reported that it had written premi-
ums of $15,518,000, earned premiums of $14,072,000, and paid out
$791,000 in claims in Virginia. 4 For 1979, St. Paul reported to the
156. Id. at 17.
157. Id.
158. BUREAU OF INSURANCE, STATE CORP. COMM'N, PRESENTATION OF VIRGINIA MEDICAL
MALPRACTICE DATA FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTIONS Table 1 (1981) (presented to House Courts of
Justice Subcommittee on Nov. 23, 1981).
159. Id. at Tables 1 and 3.
160. Id. at Table 28.
161. Id. at Table 1.
162. Id. at Table 14.
163. BUREAU OF INSURANCE, STATE CORP. Comt'N, REPORT ON PROPERTY AND CASUALTY
INSURERS TRANSACTING Busisss IN VIRGINIA DURING 1977 65R (1977).
164. BUREAU OF INSURANCE, STATE CORP. CoMM'N, REPORT ON PROPERTY AND CASUALTY
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SCC that it had written premiums of $16,720,000, earned premi-
ums of $15,518,000, and paid out $3,263,000 in claims.165 Direct
premium writings in Virginia during 1980 for all lines were
$40,816,000.16s
According to A.M. Best Company, which publishes the financial -
statements of the nation's insurance companies, for the six years
1975-1980, St. Paul, on a nationwide basis earned premiums of
$717,098,000 and paid out losses of $70,142,000167 (approximately
9.8% of premium income).168 For the six years St. Paul reserved
$257,620,000 for known claims and another $458,254,000 for claims
incurred but not reported (IBNR).169 With approximately 65% of
its assets, some $2.1 billion, invested in bonds, it is estimated that
St. Paul had investment income of $91,251,000 over these years.
This is some $21 million more than it paid in claims.17 0
INSuRES TRNSACTING BUSINESS N VmGINIA DURING 1978 65R (1978).
165. BUREAU OF INSURANCE, STATE CORP. COmm'N, REPORT ON PROPERTY AND CASUALTY
INSURERS TRANSACTING BusIEss IN VIRGINIA DURING 1979 65R (1979).
166. A.M. BEST Co., BEST'S INSURANCE REPORTS PROPERTY CASUALTY 1711 (1981).
167. Id.
168. ST. PAUL FIRE AN MARINE INS. Co., 1980 ANNUAL REPORT, Schedule P (1981).
169. An IBNR loss is an estimate of claims not now known, but which may be reported in
the future. It is listed as a liability of the company although it may never be paid. See A.M.
BEST Co., supra note 167.
170. A.M. BEST Co., supra note 167, app. The following graphically demonstrates the
cited figures.
ST. PAUL
1973 - 198D
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2591251
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For the occurrence year 1975, St. Paul reserved $38,080,000 for
IBNR losses in its medical malpractice line and deducted this sum
as an expense.171 Six years later it estimated unpaid incurred losses
for that year at $24,816,000; this means that the St. Paul originally
overestimated its 1975 reserves by some 35%. The company has
consistently over estimated its IBNR reserves for the medical mal-
practice line for each year, averaging an overestimation of about
25% for the six years ending 1980. As a result, St. Paul has re-
ceived tax deductions for losses it did not incur and has continued
to receive income from the sums never paid out and retained in
investments.
For the year 1975, A.M. Best Company reported St. Paul had
earned premiums of $52,718,000 in its medical malpractice lines
only, actually paid out to claimants $10,502,000, paid $5,054,000 in
loss adjustment expenses, and reserved $9,261,000 for known losses
(excluding IBNR reserves) and loss expenses.17 2 As of 1980, the
difference between what it earned ($52.7 million) and what it had
paid out ($10.5 million) and spent for "loss adjustment expense"
($5 million) was $36.5 million. Yet, only another $9.2 million re-
mained to be paid. 7 3 A St. Paul executive reportedly told the Con-
ference of Insurance Legislators that St. Paul had lost money in
medical malpractice throughout 1975, but that the line had been
"generally profitable" during 1976 and 1977.'17 St. Paul reported in
1980 it had earned during its corporate history, $6.5 billion in pre-
miums and had paid out $2.7 billion in all lines of insurance. 7 5 In
1980 it had $3.3 billion in assets, an increase of $495 million from
the previous year; St. Paul had a surplus of $696 million plus an-
other $36 million in special reserve funds ($732 million), as com-
pared with $184 million possessed at the end of 1975.171 This is an
increase in surplus of almost 400% over the five year period.
171. ST. PAuL FIRE AND MARIN INs. Co., supra note 168. See BEST'S CAsuALTY Loss RE-
sERvE DEP'T, MEDicAL MALPRACncE, St. Paul Group, Data Bank No. 00080 (1981) [hereinaf-
ter cited as REsERv].
172. RESERVE, supra note 171, Reports 01 and 03. The term loss expense includes all pay-
ments for legal expenses, including attorney's and witness' fees and court costs; salaries and
expenses of investigators, adjusters and field men; rents; office supplies and expenses; sala-
ries and expenses of office employees; home office expenses; and all other payments under or
on account of such injuries.
173. A. TonrUs, INWsmLE BANKrmS - EVERn'MNG THE INsuRANcE INDusTRY NEVER
WANTED You To KNoW 31-32 (1982).
174. Id.
175. ST. PAuL FiRE AD MARINE INs. Co., supra note 168.
176. A.M. BEST Co., supra note 167.
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The insurance industry is not regulated by the United States
Government. Rather, the states have primacy in regulating insur-
ance due to the McCarron-Ferguson Act passed in 1944.177 Critics
in the Congress and elsewhere have since charged that state insur-
ance departments have not adequately protected insurance con-
sumers. Whether this is true for Virginia remains to be seen.
The General Accounting Office (GAO) reported to Congress on
October 9, 1979 on needed improvements in state regulation of the
insurance business.178 This report reviewed the resources and ac-
tivities of all state insurance departments in the United States and
evaluated some of them. It concluded that there were serious
shortcomings in state laws and regulatory activities with respect to
protecting the interest of insurance consumers in the United
States. In particular, the GAO said that most state insurance de-
partments do not have systematic procedures to determine
whether insurance consumers are being treated properly regarding
claims payments, rate-setting, and protection from unfair
discrimination.
The GAO observed that in general, the number of individuals on
insurance department staffs with relevant professional training is
small. Departments spend little to upgrade staff skills, and salary
levels are low in relation to the salaries of similar professionals
elsewhere. 179 GAO stated that most states do not have specialized
examiners and that few states have the capacity to do computer-
ized audits.180 The GAO found the degree of scrutiny given impor-
tant increase requests varies among the states.18 Among those
states which the GAO examined, only Texas and Massachusetts
conducted an original actuarial analysis enabling them to indepen-
dently recommend the appropriate level of insurance rates. The
GAO further observed that competition182 was not effective in
177. BUREAU OF INSURANCE, STATE CORP. COMM'N, COMPETITION IN THE PROPERTY AND CAS-
UALTY INSURANCE INDUSTRY: AN EVALUATION OF ALTERNATIVE METHODS OF RATE REGULATION
12 (1978) [hereinafter cited as COMPETITION].
178. COMPTROLLER GENERAL, GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, PAD-79-72A, ISSUES AND
NEEDED IMPROvEMENTS IN STATE REGULATIONS OF THE INSURANCE BusINEsS (1979). Copies of
GAO Reports are available free of charge by writing U.S. General Accounting Office, Distri-
bution Section, Room 1518, 441 G. Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20548.
179. Id. at ch. 3.
180. Id. at ch. 4.
181. Id. at ch. 5.
182. See generally COMPETITION, supra note 177; BUREAU OF INSURANCE, STATE CORP.
COMM'N, ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER (Aug. 25,1975). Property and casualty insurance premiums,
except for medical malpractice and workmen's compensation insurance, are rated competi-
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achieving the best rates because of lack of consumer information in
many lines of insurance.
Moreover, GAO reported that insurance regulation is not charac-
terized by an arms-length relationship between the regulators and
the regulated. About half of the state insurance commissioners
were previously employed by the insurance industry, and approxi-
mately the same proportion joined the industry after leaving
office.183
IV. THE BILLS BEFORE THE 1982 GENERAL ASSEMBLY
Two bills on the subject of medical malpractice insurance cover-
age were offered in the House of Delegates during the 1982 Session
of the General Assembly. The first would have repealed the limita-
tion on malpractice recovery specified by the Code.18 4 The second
bill, offered on the same date, affected two code sections and would
have increased the minimum insurance requirement of tax exempt
hospitals from $100,000 to $1,000,000.115 In addition, that bill also
would have increased the limit of recovery in medical malpractice
actions from $750,000 to $1,000,000.186
Prior to the introduction of the two bills in question, a Subcom-
mittee had been appointed by the House Courts of Justice Com-
mittee. Its charge was to study the constitutional issues regarding
limitation on recovery in medical malpractice cases. The Subcom-
mittee met prior to the 1982 session, and was chaired by Delegate
Bernard Cohen of Alexandria. Appearing before the Subcommittee
when it met in September, November and December of 1981 were
several attorneys representing the Virginia Trial Lawyers Associa-
tion, as well as lobbyists representing the Virginia Medical Society,
the Virginia Hospital Association, the Virginia Hospital Insurance
Reciprocal and other insurance carriers. The Medical Society con-
ceded, through its lobbyists, that no claims of $750,000 had been
paid in Virginia to that date,18 7 and indicated that it had employed
tively in Virginia. VA. CODE ANN. § 38.1-279.29 to -.57 (Repl. Vol. 1981).
183. James W. Newman, who served as Virginia's Insurance Commissioner between 1976
and 1981, reportedly became a Vice President of the American Insurance Association (AIA),
a trade and service organization of the property and casualty insurance industry. Part of
AIA's role is to provide legislative services. St. Paul is a member of AIA, which lobbies
throughout Virginia.
184. H. 951, Va. Gen. Assem. (1982).
185. H. 952, Va. Gen. Assem. (1982).
186. Id.
187. HousE COURTS OF JUSTICE Sus-CoMMrrraE STUDYING CONsTrruTioNAL IssuEs Sun-
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an actuarial firm to appear at the Subcommittee's January, 1982
meeting. s The representative from the American Insurance Asso-
ciation (AIA), comprised of 145 companies including St. Paul, con-
ceded "that the premiums for medical malpractice insurance in
Virginia are [sic] lower than the national average,"1819 and agreed
that use of a medical panel was an economic rather than a policy
decision. The AIA representative further conceded that the larger
malpractice cases have not been going to the panel. 190
The Executive Secretary of the Supreme Court of Virginia
stated to the subcommittee that 125-130 panels had been con-
ducted during 1981 (an average of two to three per week) and that
in 79% of the cases a decision for the defendant resulted, while in
only approximately 12 to 13 % of the cases a decision was rendered
for the plaintiff. The Executive Secretary also reported that the
circuit judges do not feel that there is a need for a judge, who
would act primarily as an administrator on the panel.191 As a com-
promise to the complete repeal of the $750,000 limitation on recov-
ery, the Medical Society proposed to the House Courts Committee
that the limitation be increased from $750,000 to $1,000,000.192
At a committee meeting in February, 1982, following an emo-
tional presentation by Mrs. LaVerne Carlson, the mother of a four
year old malpractice victim,193 House Bill 952, increasing the limits
to $1,000,000, passed the Court of Justice Committee by a vote of
9-2, as amended to provide that the new $1,000,000 limit apply
separately to each health care provider. The bill included specific
language referring to "provider and any other person insured
under any malpractice liability insurance policy covering such pro-
vider"194 and also stated that "in order for a health care provider
to receive the benefit of legislation herein, such health care pro-
vider shall carry liability insurance in the amount of at least
ROUNDING § 8.01-581.15, REPORT TO VIRGINIA GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF 1982 (1981) (minutes of
Nov. 23, 1981, at 1) [hereinafter cited as SuB-CoMMrTEE].
188. At the January, 1982, meeting of the Sub-Committee, the author did not observe the
presence of an actuary employed by the Medical Society of Virginia.
189. SuB-CoMMrrrs, supra note 187, minutes of November 23, 1981, at 1.
190. Id.
191. Id. at 2.
192. Id. at 1.
193. Carlson v. Jamison, No. A-830-L (Cir. Ct. City of Richmond, Va., 1980). Christopher
E. Carlson suffered severe anoxic brain and kidney damage from which he never recovered.
At the time of his death on July 9, 1982, his medical and hospital bills exceeded $400,000.
This paper is dedicated to Chris.
194. H. 952 as amended, Va. Gen. Assem. (1982).
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$1,000,000 per occurrence. ' 195 Patron Cohen then moved to pass by
indefinitely House Bill 951 which would have repealed the limit
completely.
House Bill 952 reached the floor of the House late on Friday
afternoon, February 19, 1982, where, with approximately 30% of
the Delegates absent, it was curiously defeated on the second read-
ing by a 35 to 35 tie vote.198
V. THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF LIMITING MAXIMUM RECOVERY IN
MEDICAL NEGLIGENCE CASES
A. Differing Views of the Constitutionality of Limitations on
Medical Malpractice Recovery
The mid-1970's saw many states pass medical malpractice re-
form legislation which contained various provisions. The Virginia
Act, like those of many other states, included a notice requirement,
set up screening panels whose findings were admissible in subse-
quent trials, and set up a "cap" or ceiling on the amount a plaintiff
could recover in a medical malpractice suit. The cap was by no
means a universal provision; some states adopted them, many did
not. For example, our neighboring states of North Carolina and
West Virginia did not adopt caps.
A number of cases have questioned the constitutionality of these
acts. Some of these cases have held entire medical negligence re-
form laws unconstitutional. 97 Others have upheld these acts
despite constitutional challenges.119 Many decisions find some por-
tions of the act constitutional and other portions unconstitu-
tional.199 Several states have found the acts constitutional in early
195. Id.
196. Journal of Virginia General Assembly (February, 1982) (regarding H. 952 as
amended). At that time, approximately 30% of the delegates were absent, some being in an
Appropriations Committee meeting, and others having left for the weekend. On a voice vote
on the second reading, the vote was 35 to 35. Of the "nays," thirty were Republican votes.
There is speculation that the Virginia Medical Society and the American Medical Political
Action Committee of the American Medical Association (AMA PAC) were large contributors
to political candidates.
Total political contributions of the AMA PAC were second only to those of the Realtors
PAC, which totaled $1,536,573. Attorneys ranked tenth with a contribution of $360,125.
FED. ELECTION COMM'N REP. (1982).
197. See Carson v. Maurer, 120 N.H. 925, 424 A.2d. 825 (1980) (Many provisions of the
malpractice act were violative of equal protection, and the remaining portions were not
severable.).
198. See Johnson v. St. Vincent Hosp., Inc., - Ind. -, 404 N.E.2d 585 (1980).
199. See Linder v. Smith, - Mont. , 629 P.2d 1187 (1981) (Unconstitutional portion of
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decisions and later reversed themselves. 00 The reasonings of the
courts are even more diverse than the holdings, but the significant
point is that various provisions of the malpractice reform statutes
have been held to be unconstitutional in many states.
B. Cases Holding Ceilings on Recovery Violative of State
Constitutions
A leading case holding a ceiling or "cap" on malpractice recovery
unconstitutional is Wright v. Central Du Page Hospital Associa-
tion.20 1 This case dealt with the Illinois statute limiting recovery in
medical malpractice actions to $500,000 The Illinois Supreme
Court distinguished both wrongful death actions and dram shop
actions by stating that the legislature in each of those instances
had created a right of action where none existed at common law.202
The legislature could, therefore, condition a legislatively granted
right by placing a limit on the recovery. Malpractice actions, on
the other hand, were common law actions; and the legislature
could not use analogies to wrongful death or dram shop actions to
justify a limitation on recovery.
Workmen's compensation was also distinguished by the Illinois
Court. The court found that the injured workman received a quid
pro quo for loss of the right to sue for unlimited sums; his em-
ployer became liable without regard to fault. 03 The court rejected
defense arguments that the badly injured plaintiff in a malpractice
action also received a quid pro quo in the form of lower insurance
premiums and lower medical costs. This brand of societal quid pro
quo was simply too nebulous and uncertain to justify a trade-off.
The court held that the Illinois scheme denied recovery to the
severly injured plaintiff on an arbitrary basis; the act therefore
constituted a special privilege in violation of the Illinois Constitu-
the act was severable; the remainder was complete and constitutional.).
200. Compare Carter v. Sparkman, 335 So. 2d 802 (Fla. 1976) (Statutes concerning medi-
ation panels are constitutional.) and Parker v. Children's Hospital of Philadelphia, 438 Pa.
106, 394 A.2d 932 (1978) (Submission of claim to arbitration before jury trial does not vio-
late right to jury trial.) with Aldana v. Holub, 381 So. 2d 231 (Fla. 1980) (Medical Mediation
Act was held unconstitutional with prospective application only.) and Mattes v. Thompson,
491 Pa. 385, 421 A.2d 190 (1980) (Lengthy delay by arbitration system does burden right to
jury trial.).
201. 63 IM. 2d 313, 347 N.E.2d 736 (1976).
202. Id. at _, 347 N.E.2d at 741-42.
203. Id. at , 347 N.E.2d at 742.
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tion.20' By basing the decision on the state constitution, 20 5 the Illi-
nois Supreme Court was able to avoid examining the issue under
equal protection standards of the United States Constitution.
C. Evaluation of Constitutionality Based on the United States
Constitution
The traditional evaluation of an equal protection question begins
with a determination of which standard of review will apply. Until
the early 1970's, the United States Supreme Court had developed a
well-recognized, two-tier approach to equal protection questions.
Under this approach, the courts would either evaluate legislative
classifications using a "strict scrutiny" standard or a "rational ba-
sis" test. The more stringent "strict scrutiny" standard requires
that legislation be necessary to the promotion of a compelling state
interest. It is employed when a statute creates a classification in-
volving a "suspect class" '206 or limits a "fundamental right. '207
Classifications are considered suspect when "the class is ... saddled
with such disabilities or subjected to a history of such purposeful,
unequal treatment, or relegated to such a position of political
powerlessness as to command extraordinary protection from the
majoritarian political process."20 8
The courts also employ strict scrutiny analysis if a "fundamental
right" is affected, even if the classification is not directed at a sus-
pect class. The Supreme Court has limited the "fundamental
rights" category to rights "explicitly or implicitly guaranteed by
the Constitution."209 If the strict scrutiny standard of review ap-
plies, that is, if a classification can be pigeonholed as affecting a
fundamental right or suspect classification, it is virtually impossi-
ble to justify the classification.
On the other hand, if the classification is found not to involve a
suspect category or fundamental right, it will be upheld if the
court can discern any rationale nexus between the created classifi-
cation and any permissible goal of government. It is not too harsh,
to state, that under this two-tier approach, the courts have simply
ignored the fairness of classifications not falling under the strict
204. Id. at , 347 N.E.2d at 743.
205. ILL. CONsT. art. IV, § 13.
206. See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944).
207. See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
208. San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriquez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973).
209. Id. at 33-34.
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scrutiny standard of review. The second tier is usually known as
the "rational nexus" standard. Under it, virtually any real or even
speculative rationale will suffice to uphold a classification.
In the early 1970's, questions began to emerge which did not fall
comfortably within this over-simplified two-tier scheme. Issues
came beofe courts which did not involve fundamental rights or sus-
pect categories, but which involved legislative categorizations so
questionable that courts felt people should be able to obtain some
relief. Courts have tried to work out appropriate solutions to this
dilemma. Generally, the solution had been the adoption of an in-
termediate standard, sometimes called the "means focused"
standard.21 0
Under this test, the standard can be stated as follows:
The Equal Protection Clause of that amendment [fourteenth
amendment] does, however, deny to States the power to legislate
that different treatment be accorded to persons placed by a statute
into different classes on the basis of criteria wholly unrelated to the
objective of that statute. A classification "must be reasonable, not
arbitrary, and must rest upon some ground of difference having a
fair and substantial relation to the object of the legislation, so that
all persons similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike.211
In examining the constitutionality of malpractice statutes, most
courts have grappled with the question of which standard was ap-
plicable. While the court in Wright v. Central Du Page Hospital
Association,212 was able to avoid frontally addressing the standard
of review examination by deciding the case under the Illinois Con-
stitution, 13 the reasoning used was quite similar to this "means
focused" standard.
The Supreme Court of New Hampshire faced the standard of
review issue squarely in Carson v. Maurer.1 4 The court evaluated
a cap limiting non-economic losses to $250,000 and determined
that the legislative classification involved neither a suspect cate-
gory nor any of the rights customarily considered fundamental. It
did find that the right to recover for personal injuries was an im-
210. See Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
211. 404 U.S. at 75-76 (quoting Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920)).
212. 63 Ill. 2d 313, 347 N.E.2d 736 (1976).
213. ILL. CONST. art. IV, § 13.
214. 120 N.H. 925, 424 A.2d 825 (1980).
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portant substantive right,215 however, and adopted the intermedi-
ate "means focused" test. The court found that the cap was arbi-
trary and lacked a fair and substantial relationship to the object of
the legislation; therefore, it could not pass this intermediate stan-
dard of review and was unconstitutional under the equal protec-
tion clause.
In Arneson v. Olson,21 6 the North Dakota Supreme Court ex-
amined the three standards of review used by the federal courts in
equal protection cases. The court chose the middle-tier approach
which called for a "close correspondence between statutory classifi-
cation and legislative goals. 217 The court ruled that the cap of
$500,000 was a violation of the state constitution's equal protection
clause. The court could see no "nexus" between the cap and the
availability of competent medical and hospital services in the
state.2
18
Perhaps the most exhaustive examination of the issue has been
in Idaho in Jones v. State Board of Medicine,1 where, the su-
preme court, in a well-reasoned opinion, seriously questioned the
constitutional validity of the 1976 Hospital Medical Liability
Act.2 20 The court adopted the "means focused" equal protection
standard,2 1 but ruled that there was not sufficient evidence to de-
cide the case and remanded it to the trial court for additional evi-
dence, findings, and conclusions. When the "means focused" test
was applied in 1980 on remand to the Fourth Judicial District of
the State of Idaho, the court found that the legislation adopted did
not substantially affect the availability of a liability insurance mar-
ket and, therefore, was unconstitutional based on equal protection
grounds.222
Courts in Ohio and Florida have treated medical malpractice
limitations on recovery in a similar manner. 23 The specific issues
215. Id. at --, 424 A.2d at 830.
216. 270 N.W.2d 125 (N.D. 1978).
217. Id. at -
218. Id. at
219. 97 Idaho 859, 555 P.2d 399 (1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 914 (1977), on remand, No.
55586 (4th Dist. Ct Ada County, Idaho, Nov. 3, 1980).
220. IDAHo CODE §§ 39-4201 to -4313 (1977).
221. 97 Idaho at -, 555 P.2d at 407.
222. Jones v. State Bd. of Medicine, No. 55586 (4th Dist. Ct. Ada County, Idaho, Nov. 3,
1980).
223. See Van Stetina v. Florida Medical Center, Inc., No. 81-05946 (Cir. Ct. Broward
County, Fla. 1982); Graleg v. Satayatham, 74 Ohio Op. 2d 316, 343 N.E.2d 832 (Ct. C.P.
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addressed by the courts in applying the "means focused" test have
been substantially the same. Each reviews a cap which has the ef-
fect of denying full recovery to the most severely injured victims of
medical negligence. Virtually the entire economic burden of the
acts, which limit recovery, is placed upon the victims who are least
able to bear the burden. The beneficiaries of these limitations are
the health care providers and their insurance carriers. Courts re-
viewing this situation usually find that the legislature has imper-
missibly divided the more seriously injured from the less seriously
injured and has placed the whole burden upon those more seri-
ously injured. This classification is not reasonably calculated to al-
leviate the crisis; hence the act is unconstitutional on equal protec-
tion grounds.
In limiting the amount of recovery for medical malpractice vic-
tims, the acts also distinguish victims of malpractice from the vic-
tims of any other form of negligence. If a crisis existed, there might
be some justification for that distinction. However, courts have
held the distinction to be an impermissible classification on the ba-
sis that the right to be made whole for an injury due to the negli-
gence of someone else is very close to a fundamental right. 24 The
evidence fails to show that this deprivation of the right of full re-
covery in a malpractice action is a reasonable way to correct a cri-
sis of doubtful validity.
The courts also find it distasteful to relieve health care providers
and their insurers of responsibility for their acts. Such a gratuitous
benefit has been characterized as special legislation in violation of
many state constitutions.2 Courts have also held the cap uncon-
stitutional on due process grounds because the cap denies full re-
covery to the plaintiff2 and other courts have held the cap uncon-
stitutional because it violates the plaintiff's right to a jury trial. 27
Cuyahoga County 1976) (noting recovery limit and citing Jones v. State Bd. of Medicine, 97
Idaho 859, 555 P.2d 399 (1976)); Simon v. St. Elizabeth Medical Center, 3 Ohio Op. 3d 164,
355 N.E.2d 903 (Ct. C.P. Montgomery County 1976) (declaring in dictum that the $200,000
limit violated equal protection.).
224. Simon v. St. Elizabeth Medical Center, 3 Ohio Op. 3d 164, 355 N.E.2d 903 (Ct. C.P.
Montgomery County 1976).
225. Wright v. Central Du Page Hosp. Ass'n, 63 IlM. 2d 313, 347 N.E.2d 736, 743 (1976).
226. American Bank & Trust Co. v. Community Hosp. of Los Gatos-Saratoga, Inc., 104
Cal. App. 3d 219, 163 Cal. Rptr. 513 (1st Dist. Ct. App. 1980).
227. Arneson v. Olson, 270 N.W.2d 125, 137 (N.D. 1978); Wright v. Central DuPage Hosp.
Ass'n., 63 Ill. 2d 313, 347 N.E.2d 736, 741 (1976).
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D. Cases Holding Ceilings on Recover, Constitutional
In Johnson v. St. Vincent Hospital, Inc.,228 the Supreme Court
of Indiana squarely upheld the cap and other aspects of the Indi-
ana malpractice scheme. It found the Act to meet both due process
and equal protection standards. The court examined the applicable
standards of review and decided that neither a fundamental right
nor suspect classification was involved. The Act was to be tested to
see whether the classification was arbitrary or unreasonable and
whether a fair and substantial relationship existed between the
classification and the purpose of the legislation creating it.229 This
approach at first glance would appear to place Indiana in the group
of states which follow some sort of intermediate category. How-
ever, the case contains conflicting language, and when the rationale
of the Indiana Supreme Court is reviewed it appears tht the court
actually followed the two-tier approach and applied the rational
nexus test.23 0 The Indiana opinion contains many speculative justi-
fications for this application. The court conjectured that high re-
coveries would have been prevented or stymied prior to the en-
actment of the cap by physicians' refusal to insure, by their
insuring with lesser policy limits, or by insurance company bank-
ruptcies.23 1 Therefore, the Act was justified. The Indiana decision
is an excellent example of what is wrong with the rational nexus
standard as applied to cases concerning ceilings on recovery. The
decision is not founded on research, fact or evidence, but upon the
judges' examination of an imaginary setting which supposedly pro-
vides justification for harshly penalizing Indiana's victims of
malpractice.
In Prendergast v. Nelson,13 2 the Nebraska Supreme Court is also
said to have upheld a $500,000 limit on malpractice recovery. Be-
cause of the language contained in the opinion, this decision is of
questionable precedential value. Three of Nebraska's seven su-
preme court justices joined in a dissent finding the statutory cap
unconstitutional.23 3 A fourth justice refused to examine the issue of
the statutory cap, because he considered the opinion advisory
228. 76 Ind. 131, 404 N.E.2d 585 (1980).
229. Id. at ., 404 N.E.2d at 600.
230. Id. at ., 404 N.E.2d at 585.
231. Id. at .. , 404 N.E.2d at 599, 601.
232. 199 Neb. 97, 256 N.W.2d 657 (1977).
233. Id. at ., 256 N.W.2d at 674 (White, C. Thomas, J., dissenting); Id. at , 256 N.W.2d
at 677 (McCoun, J., dissenting, and Boslaugh, J., dissenting).
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only.21 4 Nevertheless, this fourth justice, in dicta, stated that the
Act contained two unconstitutional provisions, one being the statu-
tory limitation. Upon examination of the views expressed in the
plurality and dissenting opinions, it is unclear whether there was
actually a majority of justices who considered the cap to be consti-
tutional. Those justices who clearly upheld the cap did so under
the rational nexus test.
The issue has been decided in California, but its present status
is not entirely clear. In American Bank and Trust Co. v. Commu-
nity Hospital at Los Gatos-Saratoga, Inc.,235 a California appellate
court held that the periodic payments provisions of amounts over
$50,000 under the 1975 Medical Injury Compensation Reform Act
were unconstitutional as violative of equal protection and due pro-
cess considerations. The court found that the classifications were
under-inclusive and so arbitrary as to deny equal protection. It was
concerned that the more severely injured rather than the less se-
verely injured patients seem to carry the burden of reform. How-
ever in Fein v. Permanente Medical Group,236 another California
appellate court upheld the constitutionality of a $25,000 cap for
non-economic losses and the periodic payments provisions using a
traditional two-tier/rational nexus approach. A definitive decision
of California's position appears to await further litigation.
In summary, the majority of those states specifically ruling on
the constitutionality of limitations of recovery have held them un-
constitutional. Generally, the courts reviewing the limitation have
found that the rights involved deserve judicial scrutiny and protec-
tion, even though these rights do not fall within the traditional
suspect classifications or burden fundamental rights which require
strict scrutiny. The limitation on recovery with its partial abolition
of the right to full recovery via jury trial goes to the very core of
our judicial system and is an issue of considerable long-range sig-
nificance to our society as a whole. The loss of the right to full
recovery must be the subject of serious review by a concerned and
interested judiciary.
234. Id. at ., 256 N.W.2d at 677 (Clinton, J., dissenting).
235. 104 Cal. App. 3d 219, 163 Cal. Rptr. 513 (lst Dist. Ct. App. 1980).
236. 121 Cal. App. 3d 135, 175 Cal. Rptr. 177 (3d Dist. Ct. App. 1981).
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VI. VIRGINIA CONSTITUTIONAL CONSIDERATIONS
A. Background on the Constitutionality Issue in Virginia
Even while the cap was under consideration in Virginia, it was
clear that such a cap would encounter serious constitutional objec-
tions. John Day, in a State Corporation Commission study, later,
incorporated into Senate Document Number 29, stated:
Serious questions arise regarding the efficacy of these types of limits
both from a constitutional and cost reduction standpoint. Constitu-
tional questions arise because the limitations usually take something
away from the injured patient without conferring some benefit. In
fact, the injured patient usually will have a tougher job of recovering
than he had prior to the enactment of these laws since these laws
also eliminate some of the more liberal negligence doctrines. The
presence of a quid pro quo is essential and in other contexts has
made the difference between the law being declared constitutional
or unconstitutional. 237
Immediately after the adoption of the Act one of Virginia's lead-
ing medical negligence defense attorneys, Thomas J. Harlan, Jr.,
questioned the constitutionality of several portions of Virginia's
malpractice act.238 After a careful examination of Wright v. Cen-
tral Du Page Hospital Association.239 Mr. Harlan concluded his
discussion of the cap in Virginia as follows:
Does not the Virginia statute's attempt to limit the common law
right of recovery for medical malpractice to the sum of $750,000
likewise constitute special legislation? In effect, does it not also at-
tempt to "change the rules of evidence in a judicial proceeding" re-
garding the amount of damages that the plaintiff can recover in a
medical malpractice suit?24 0
B. Issues Concerning Constitutionality of the Limitation On
237. COMMISSION TO STUDY THE COSTS AND ADMINISTRATION OF HEALTH CARE SERVIcES,
INTERIM REPORT TO THE GOVERNOR AND THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF VIRGINIA OF 1976, S. Doc.
No. 29, at 63-66 (1976).
238. Harlan, Virginia's New Medical Malpractice Review Panel and Some Questions It
Raises, 11 U. RICH. L. REv. 51 (1976).
239. 63 IMI. 2d 313, 347 N.E.2d 736 (1976).
240. Harlan, supra note 238, at 67.
8411982]
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
Recovery
1. Equal Protection
The threshold question in an equal protection case is what stan-
dard of review the court should employ. As previously discussed in
this article,241 the traditional approach has been a two-tier ap-
proach. If the legislatively created classification involves funda-
mental rights or suspect groups, then the action of the legislature
is subject to strict scrutiny. If neither of those categories is in-
volved, a rational nexus standard is applied. The malpractice cap
may not involve either a suspect group or rights traditionally de-
fined as fundamental.
Nonetheless, the legislature has created a number of important
classifications. The Act classifies those who suffer damages in ex-
cess of $750,000 differently from those who suffer damages in lesser
sums;2 42 the Act differentiates those persons who are injured by
malpractice from tort victims injured in other ways;243 and the Act
treats health care providers differently from other tortfeasors.
When the Act is considered as a whole, it is clear that health care
providers are extended a considerable benefit at the expense of
those few patients most severely injured by medical negligence.
The innocent but seriously injured victim is forced to shoulder the
load placed upon him by the wrongdoer to the benefit of the
wrongdoer and only indirectly to the benefit of society. These
types of laws impinge substantially on traditional notions of fair
play and constitutionality. The courts are charged with the duty to
protect innocent victims from this type of special interest legisla-
tion. Virginia courts should not avoid this duty under the guise of
a largely mythical evaluation available under the rational nexus
text.
The appropriate standard of review, adopted by most courts, is
the "means focused" test which should be adopted by Virginia
judges in evaluating the constitutionality of the malpractice cap.2 44
The basis of the "means focused" test is that the equal protection
clause denies the state the power to legislate different treatment
for different categories of persons in ways that are wholly unre-
lated to the objectives of the statute. Classifications, in order to
241. See supra notes 206-12 and accompanying text.
242. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-581.15 (Repl. Vol. 1977).
243. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 8.01-581.15 to -581.18 (Repl. Vol. 1977 and Cum. Supp. 1982).
244. See supra notes 210-23 and accompanying text.
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meet the requirements of the equal protection clause, must be rea-
sonable and not arbitrary, and they must rest upon some "ground
of difference having a fair and substantial relation to the object of
the legislation, so that all persons similarly circumstanced shall be
treated alike. '24
5
The "means focused" test accepts the objective of the statute
but then examines the class to see if the legislature is using the
"means" reasonably, fairly, and realistically in achieving the objec-
tive. If the "means" does not meet this standard, the act violates
equal protection. In a case testing the constitutionality of the mal-
practice act, the court would be expected to accept the objective
that the legislature can correct a so-called crisis claimed by health
care providers. But the court should examine the crisis to deter-
mine its nature and extent and then scrutinize the classifications
made to see if they fairly and reasonably focus on alleviating the
crisis. The Virginia Supreme Court, in cases decided since Reed v.
Reed,246 has followed the "means focused" test. It ruled that the
Virginia General Assembly may not pass laws treating one class
differently from another unless the classification relates in a rea-
sonable way to the legislative objective.247
When a court applies the "means focused" test to the malprac-
tice ceiling in Virginia, it will find that the crisis, as identified by
the legislature, did not exist at the time the Act was adopted.248 At
most, hospitals had a brief availability problem in obtaining basic
limits coverage;249 this temporary problem was completely unre-
lated to large verdicts or a $750,000 limitation. The court will find
that there was no shortage of people entering the medical profes-
sion or other health care fields,' 0 and will also find that there were
no settlements or jury verdicts above $750,000 in the five years
preceding the adoption of the Act.251 Therefore, it was impossible
for large verdicts to have had any real effect on rates for malprac-
tice insurance in Virginia.
245. Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 75-76 (1971) (quoting Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253
U.S. 412, 415 (1920)).
246. 404 U.S. at 71.
247. Duke v. County of Pulaski, 219 Va. 428, 247 S.E.2d 824 (1978) (upholding classifica-
tion scheme for automobile tax purposes); Archer v. Mayes, 213 Va. 633, 194 S.E.2d 707
(1973) (upholding different treatment of men and women eligible for jury service).
248. See supra notes 56-64 and accompanying text.
249. See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
250. See supra notes 56-57 and accompanying text.
251. See supra notes 146-48 and accompanying text.
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Cases involving damages of $750,000 or more are rare. Where
there are such cases, many involve brain-damaged persons, often
children. The medical costs alone, over the lifetime of the child,
greatly exceed $750,000. Under the Virginia Act, these persons are
victimized a second time by a legal system which simply does not
care what happens to them. This harsh injustice cries out for cor-
rection by the Virginia court system. Virginia has already recog-
nized the "means focused" test, and under that test, the cap is
clearly in violation of equal protection.
Because no malpractice recovery had exceeded $750,000 prior to
the enactment of the cap, it would take great leaps of legal imagi-
nation to determine how non-existent claims could have been af-
fecting insurance rates, or how temporary unavailability of basic
limits coverage for hospitals could have affected high-dollar cover-
age for physicians. It is thus apparent that a Virginia court apply-
ing an even lower level of scrutiny, the rational nexus test, could
still find the Act unconstitutional. For Virginia, the situation a
court would face under the rational nexus test is one where the
legislature established a cap which eliminates claims above a limit
which no medical malpractice case had surpassed. The rational
nexus test was never intended to be a complete abdication of au-
thority by the courts. Since the cap passed by the Virginia General
Assembly is totally out of line with the history of claims in Vir-
ginia, and the crisis as identified by the legislature in its preamble
is demonstrably erroneous, a court could conceiveably hold the
Virginia cap unconstitutional as bearing no rational nexus or rela-
tionship to the legislative goal.
2. Special Legislation Prohibitions
At least four prohibitions against special legislation are found in
the Constitution of Virginia.252 These include the prohibition that
"no man, or set of men, is entitled to exclusive or separate emolu-
ments or privileges from the community, but in consideration of
public services. "253 A second provision prohibits the General As-
sembly, by special legislation, from granting relief in cases where
the courts or other tribunals have jurisdiction.254 A third provision
prohibits the enactment of any local, special or private law "regu-
lating the practice in, or the jurisdiction of, or changing the rules
252. VA. CONST. art. I, § 4, and art. IV, § 14.
253. VA. CONST. art. I, § 4.
254. VA. CONST. art. IV, § 14 para. 2.
[Vol. 16:799844
LIMITATION ON RECOVERY
of evidence in any judicial proceedings or inquiry before the courts
or other tribunals or providing or changing the methods of collect-
ing debts .... ,,255 The final provision prohibits the General Assem-
bly from enacting any law which grants to "any private corpora-
tion, association, or individual any special or exclusive right,
privilege, or immunity."2 56 Clearly, these prohibitions may apply to
legislation which limits the recovery afforded victims of medical
malpractice in the name of protecting the availability of medical
malpractice insurance.
As the Illinois Supreme Court found in Wright v. Central Du
Page Hospital Association,57 there is an advantage to examining
the state constitution. The state constitution in Virginia, and ap-
parently in Illinois,'258 affords something similar to equal protec-
tion, although there is not an expressed equal protection clause.
Moreover, the courts are unencumbered by the necessity of deter-
mining the appropriate standard of review under the equal protec-
tion clause. The Virginia Constitution does not expressly contain
an equal protection clause; however, the four prohibitions against
special legislation discussed previously, 59 stand on their own as
part of the Constitution of Virginia.
The limitation on recovery in medical malpractice actions cre-
ates an exclusive privilege for the medical community by exempt-
ing it from the effects of its wrongdoing which may result in recov-
eries in excess of $750,000. This privilege is not given in
consideration of public services; 260 therefore, the limitation appears
to be a facial violation of article I, section 4 of the Virginia Consti-
tution. The special legislation prohibitions discussed above are also
violated by the grant to the medical community of exclusive immu-
nity from suits over $750,000.261 At the same time, the limitation
deprives the most seriously injured victims of malpractice of their
right to recover a debt owed them, and changes the rules of evi-
dence to be used in proceedings regarding medical malpractice
claims.2 62
255. VA. CONST. art. IV, § 14(3).
256. VA. CONST. art. IV, § 14(18).
257. 63 MII. 2d 313, 347 N.E.2d 736 (1976).
258. ILL. CONST. art. IV, § 13.
259. See supra note 253 and accompanying text.
260. See supra note 253.
261. See supra note 256.
262. See supra note 255.
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The Idaho Supreme Court in Jones v. State Board of
Medicine,265 made an extensive examination of the special legisla-
tive concept and decided that the general purpose of such constitu-
tional provisions was to prevent the bestowing of favors on pre-
ferred groups. In Virginia in the middle 1970's, the physicians and
other health care providers came to the legislature and asked for a
special dispensation from the effects of their own acts of negli-
gence, for their own economic benefit. The legislature obliged. It is
the very purpose of special legislation provisions in Virginia's Con-
stitution to prohibit precisely this sort of legislative favoritism.
3. Due Process
In addition to the equal protection and special law problems
pervading Virginia's malpractice cap, this legislation also presents
due process problems. By denying the most severely injured plain-
tiffs the full amount of their damages, a limit such as that found in
Section 8.01-581.15 of the Virginia Code violates the concept of
substantive due process. 2 4 Consistency with substantive due pro-
cess under United States Supreme Court decisions requires that
the legislation be neither arbitrary nor capricious.26 5 The due pro-
cess clauses of the United States Constitution26 and the Constitu-
tion of Virginia 267 use virtually the same terms. In Archer & John-
son v. Mayes, 2e8 the Virginia Supreme Court held that the state
constitution's due process clause was not broader than the federal
provisions. 269 Therefore, due process arguments relating to federal
standards are applicable to considerations of the state due process
claims.
Commentators agree that the choice of any malpractice recovery
limitation by a legislature must be an arbitrary one.270 A view of
263. 97 Idaho 859, 555 P.2d 399 (1976), cert. denied 432 U.S. 914 (1977), on remand, No.
55586 (4th Dist. Ct. Ada County, Idaho, Nov. 3, 1980).
264. American Bank & Trust Co. v. Community Hosp. of Los Gatos-Saratoga, Inc., 104
Cal. App. 3d 219, 163 Cal. Rptr. 513 (1st Dist. Ct. App. 1980); Wright v. Central Du Page
Hosp. Ass'n., 63 IMI. 2d 313, 347 N.E.2d 736 (1976).
265. See West Coast Hotel v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937); Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S.
502 (1934); Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113 (1876).
266. U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1.
267. VA. CONST. art. I, § 11.
268. 213 Va. 633, 194 S.E.2d 707 (1973).
269. Archer addressed the issue of sex discrimination only as it relates to the due process
clauses of the Virginia and United States Constitutions.
270. Redish, Legislative Response to the Medical Malpractice Insurance Crisis: Consti-
tutional Implications, 55 Tax. L. Rav. 759, 784 (1977); Comment, Recent Medical Malprac-
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the legislative history behind Virginia's enactment shows the most
casual observer the arbitrariness and capriciousness of the General
Assembly's decision on the $750,000 amount. No legislative study
recommended either this legislation or any statutory language
placing a limitation on recovery.
The preamble to Chapter 611 of the 1976 Acts of Assembly is
certainly a conclusion that is not binding on courts.2 71 The recital
of the "findings" that health care providers were entering a "diffi-
cult period" should not preclude the courts' inquiry regarding due
process; or any other grounds for "the mere recitation of benign
(statutory) purpose is not an automatic shield which protects
against inquiry into the actual purposes underlying a statutory
scheme.- 27 2
The United States Supreme Court, on several occasions, has
held that it "need not in equal protection cases accept at face
value assertions of legislative purposes, when an examination of
the legislative scheme and its history demonstrates that the as-
serted purpose could not have been the goal of the legislation. '2 7 3
The $750,000 limitation, placed on medical malpractice liability
in the waning hours of the 1976 Virginia General Assembly274 after
several quarter-million dollar jumps, was clearly an arbitrary
figure, capriciously inserted at the whim of the Conference Com-
mittee of six members of the Assembly. This history demonstrates
that Section 8.01-581.15 of the Virginia Code does violate the pro-
visions of substantive due process of both the Virginia and the
United States Constitutions, and should be declared invalid on this
ground.
C. Practicality of Test by the Supreme Court of Virginia
A number of factors hinder a constitutional challenge to the cap
tice Legislation - A First Checkup, 50 TuL. L. REv. 655, 668 (1976).
271. See, e.g., Jones v. State Bd. of Medicine, 97 Idaho 859, 555 P.2d 399, 409-10 (1976).
272. Weinberger v. Wiesenfield, 420 U.S. 636, 648 (1975), cited in Graleg. v. Satayatham,
74 Ohio Op. 2d 316, 343 N.E.2d 832, 837 (Ct. C.P. Cuyahoga County 1976).
273. Weinberger, 420 U.S. at 648; see also Jimenez v. Weinberger, 417 U.S. 628, 634
(1974) (holding that the effect of a statute regulating inheritance by illegitimates does not
support the purpose stated); United States Dep't of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528,
536-37 (1973) (holding that other provisions of a law regulating food stamps cast doubt on
the stated purpose of the amendment); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (holding
that the history and effect of a law regulating contraceptives reveal that the purpose derived
from the title could not have been the real purpose).
274. See supra note 196 and accompanying text.
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on recovery in malpractice action. First, a plaintiff must obtain a
judgment over $750,000. This is a herculean task in and of itself,
because a verdict of that size is not easy to obtain from Virginia
juries. Complicating this difficulty is the judicial delay and expense
in preparing and trying complex cases. Because most plaintiffs who
are egregiously injured cannot afford a three to four year delay and
cannot afford the thousands of dollars required to prosecute a
medical negligence case, few cases of this magnitude reach a ver-
dict. Moreover, delay and expense are further increased by the
panel system, for it a panel is requested, the case must in essence
be prepared and tried twice. In addition, the case can be delayed
another year by abuse in the discovery process. The appellate pro-
cess alone, if a writ is granted, will take approximately two years.
By the time a medical case works its way through the court system,
many seriously injured plaintiffs may have died. The costs in time
and effort, from the initiation of a suit to its final disposition, stag-
ger the imagination.
Plaintiffs are encouraged to request trial courts to delay ruling
on the constitutional question until after a large verdict, over
$750,000, is returned. After all, a verdict for less than that sum
renders the limitation on recovery issue moot unless the jury has
been advised of the limitation. Moreover, plaintiffs should be per-
mitted to argue ad damnum without reference by anyone to the
cap. Certainly, a reference by the trial judge or defense attorney to
a $750,000 limitation may unduly and unfairly influence most ju-
ries. Plaintiffs should further maintain that the limit on recovery,
even if it meets a constitutional challenge, is a limit on pain and
suffering only and is inapplicable to other damages and death
cases.
Plaintiffs' lawyers should be aware of opportunities to raise this
issue on cross-appeals and in other ways so that courts will be
forced to confront and rule upon this important issue.
VII. CONCLUSION
The limitation on recovery in medical negligence cases in Vir-
ginia is unconstitutional because it unfairly discriminates against
those who are the most seriously injured. It grants a special privi-
lege to a select few while working to the disadvantage of those se-
verely injured by acts of medical malpractice. There was no
demonstrated need for legislation in 1976 which limited recovery
for malpractice and there remains no justification for it today.
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Courts faced with this issue should declare the cap violative of
the Constitution of Virginia, apply a "means focused" test to find
it unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause of the
United States Constitution, and declare it in violation of due
process.

